Stochastic model of effectiveness for man-hardware-software system by Abbas, Bahtiar Saleh
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1989




Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Industrial Engineering Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University
Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Abbas, Bahtiar Saleh, "Stochastic model of effectiveness for man-hardware-software system " (1989). Retrospective Theses and
Dissertations. 8905.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/8905
INFORMATION TO USERS 
The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the text directly from the original or 
copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies 
are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type 
of computer printer. 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the 
quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, 
colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, 
print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction. 
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these 
will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material 
had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. 
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the 
upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in 
equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also 
photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced 
form at the back of the book. These are also available as 
one exposure on a standard 35mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and white photographic print for an additional 
charge. 
Photographs included in the original manuscript have 
been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher 
quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are 
available for any photographs or illustrations appearing 
in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order. 
University Microfilms International 
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600 

Order Number 8920102 
Stochastic model of effectiveness for man-hardware-software 
system 
Abbas, Bàhtiar Saleh, Ph.D. 
Iowa State University, 1989 
U M I  
300N.ZeebR4 
Ann Aibor, MI 48106 

Stochastic model of effectiveness 
for man-hardware-software system 
Bahtiar Saleh Abbas 
A Dissertation Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 




For the Graduate College 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
1989 
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
Signature was redacted for privacy.
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1 Definitions of System Effectiveness 1 
1.2 Definition of Failure 2 
1.3 Definition of Availability 3 
1.4 Definition of Reliability 3 
1.5 Human Performance 4 
1.6 Objective of This Study 5 
1.7 Contents of This Study 6 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 8 
2.1 Hardware Reliability 8 
2.2 Human Reliability 12 
2.3 Software Reliability 16 
2.4 Models for System Effectiveness 22 
2.4.1 Hardware System 22 
2.4.2 Human-Hardware System 25 
2.4.3 Hardware-Software System 29 
3 SINGLE-MACHINE SYSTEM PROBLEMS 33 
iii 
3.1 System Description 33 
3.1.1 System Definition 33 
3.1.2 Formulation of System Effectiveness 36 
3.1.3 System Variables 37 
3.2 Development of Effectiveness Models 43 
3.3 Availability Derivation 50 
3.4 Reliability Derivation 53 
3.5 Quantification of Human Performance 54 
3.6 Illustrations 55 
3.7 Numerical Examples 59 
3.7.1 Example 1 59 
3.7.2 Example 2 61 
4 iV-MACHINE SYSTEM PROBLEM 64 
4.1 System Descriptions 64 
4.1.1 System Definition 64 
4.1.2 Formulation of System Effectiveness 66 
4.1.3 System Variables 67 
4.2 Development of Effectiveness Models 70 
4.3 Availability Derivation 74 
4.4 Reliability Derivation 77 
4.5 Quantification of Human Performance 78 
4.6 Illustration 78 
iv 
5 MODEL EXTENSIONS 82 
5.1 Systems with Multiple Operating Modes 82 
5.2 Systems with Several Task Types 93 
5.3 Systems with General Failure and Repair Distributions 98 
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 103 
7 BIBLIOGRAPHY 105 
8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 116 
9 APPENDIX A: PROGRAM I 117 
10 APPENDIX B; PROGRAM II 131 
V 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 2.1: Hardware reliability versus software reliability 32 
Table 3.1: Analytical and simulation results for Example 1 61 
Table 3.2: Analytical and simulation results for Example 2 63 
vi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2.1: Complete failure pattern for equipment 12 
Figure 2.2: Steps associated with THERP 14 
Figure 2.3: A typical reliability growth model 18 
Figure 3.1: Up and down behavior of the system (i2 = 2) 34 
Figure 3.2: Availability and reliability of the system 35 
Figure 3.3: The proposed system-effectiveness model 37 
Figure 3.4: Task-arrival process 38 
Figure 3.5: Typical probability function for detection of a task arrival . 40 
Figure 3.6: Typical probability function for human-performance accuracy 41 
Figure 3.7: Probability-density function for performance times 42 
Figure 3.8: Task arrival process 46 
Figure 3.9: Adjustment of time 48 
Figure 3.10: System rate diagram for H = 4 52 
Figure 4.1: Up and down behavior of the system { N  —  2 ,  R  =  2 )  . . . .  6 5  
Figure 4.2: Availability and reliability of the system 66 
Figure 4.3: Typical probability functions for detection of a task arrival . 68 
Figure 4.4: Typical probability functions for human-performance accuracy 69 
vii 
Figure 4.5: Probability-density functions for performance times 69 
Figure 4.6: System rate diagram for i? = 3 and N  =  2  76 
Figure 5.1: System rate diagram ; 84 
Figure 5.2: Typical probability function for detection of a task arrival . 90 
Figure 5.3: Typical probability function for human-performance accuracy 90 
Figure 5.4: Probability-density function for performance times 91 
Figure 5.5: Task Performance levels in target example 95 
Figure 5.6: Probability of performing at level I when the task is type m 95 
Figure 5.7: Probability of task success, given task performance level I . 96 
Figure 5.8: A complete cycle of on and off times 98 
1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
A major concern in system analysis is with the lifetime operation of the system 
so that it can fulfill its required mission successfully. To accomplish this purpose, 
the minimum requirements for some measures of system effectiveness have always 
been imposed in the design and manufacturing stages of the system. Some require­
ments to be considered are hardware subsystem, software subsystem, and human 
(operator) performance. Therefore, the selection of the most appropriate measure 
of system effectiveness based on the operationed or system performance as it relates 
to all of the system components becomes important [55]. 
1.1 Definitions of System Effectiveness 
System effectiveness defined in A RING [2j is "the probability that the sys­
tem can successfully meet a specified condition." Another famous and widely used 
definition of system effectiveness is from MIL-STD-721B [14], in which system ef­
fectiveness is defined as "a measure of the degree to which an item can be expected 
to achieve a set of specified mission requirements, which can be expressed as a func­
tion of availability, dependability, and capability." In fact, as suggested by Kuo [551, 
system effectiveness is a measure describing the overall capability of a system to 
accomplish its intended mission. He defined system effectiveness as "the probability 
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measure of the achievement of a specific mission goal." This definition of system 
effectiveness has been adopted for the current study. Under this definition, we have 
two key submeasures: 1) how ready the system is to function (availability), 2) how 
well it performs (reliability). Thus, system effectiveness is the joint probability 
measure of availability and reliability. Before adopting this definition, we must ex­
plicitly define what we mean by failure, availability, and reliability. We will adopt 
the definitions used in [107]. 
1.2 Definition of Failure 
There are many types and degrees of failure; one definition of failure stated 
in MIL-STD-721B [14] is "the inability of an item (hardware or human factor) to 
perform within previously specified limits." Regarding software, Lipow :64l defines 
failure as a situation in which a computer program fault is elicited by some kind of 
input data and which leads to the computer's incorrectly computing the specified 
function. These are generally acceptable definitions; however, they do not address 
the degree of failure: that is, is the system totally incapacitated or is it simply 
functioning at a lower level of performance? In addition, there are failures that are 
independent of other components and there are those that are dependent, having 
been caused by other component failures or causing the failure of other equipment. 
Again this delineation is not treated. In this study, we will combine the above defi­
nition stated by MIL-STD-721B [14] with the consideration of the degree of failure. 
In other words, the possibility that the system under investigation is performing 
under a lower level of operating condition will be incorporated in the proposed 
model. 
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1.3 Definition of Availability 
In general, availability is the measure of readiness of an item to be put into ser­
vice when called upon. Some authors have classified availability as follows [61]: 1) 
pointwise availability: the probability that the system is operational at any random 
time <; 2) average uptime availability: the proportion of time in a specified interval 
that the system is available for use; and 3) steady-state availability: the average 
uptime availability when the time interval considered is very large. The appropri- • 
ateness of the availability representation depends upon the system mission and the 
operating conditions. Steady-state availability may be a satisfactory measure for 
systems that are operated continuously. Average uptime availability may be the 
most satisfactory measure for systems whose usage is defined by a duty cycle. For 
systems required to perform a function at any random time, pointwise availability 
may be the most satisfactory measure. 
1.4 Definition of Reliability 
Generally speaking, reliability is the probability of an item performing its func­
tion for the period of time intended under the operational conditions encountered. 
Under this definition, there are two aspects of reliability: whether the equipment 
operates as designed and whether it achieves the desired results. The attributes of 
reliability for hardware [55] are utilization and environmental effect; for operator 
[55] are human reliability, selection, experience, motivation, working environment, 
training and discipline, human engineering, performance, capacity, and environmen­
tal effect. Analogous to hardware, the attributes for software are utilization and 
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environmental effect. 
1.5 Human Performance 
Human performance plays an important role in the overall reliability of en­
gineering systems because most systems are interconnected with human links and 
much research and many publications address human performance in systems (see 
Ref. [58]). According to studies quoted by this reference, depending upon the de­
gree of human involvement in the system, the human component is responsible for 
20%-90% of the failures in many systems. This means that human performance 
must be considered in reliability analysis, in order to obtain a more realistic picture 
of system reliability. 
The human reliability aspect, according to Dhillon [15], can be improved sig­
nificantly by following human-factor principles during the system-design phase. He 
also pointed out that, on the other hand, factors such as careful selection and train­
ing of concerned personnel also help to increase human reliability. One important 
area that affects human performance and its reliability is stress. An over-stressed 
person will obviously have a higher probability of making errors. In order to min­
imize the occurrence of human errors, operator limitations or characteristics must 
be considered during the design phase by the design, and reliability engineers. The 
consequence of human error may vary from one set of equipment to another or one 
task to another. Furthermore, consequences may range from minor to severe, from 
delay in system performance to loss of life. 
1.6 Objective of This Study 
Reliability, availability and dependability have been widely studied as measures 
of system effectiveness. Combinations of some of these have also been successfully 
modeled as measures of effectiveness for a specific system. Furthermore, in the last 
few years, additional factors such as environmental and operational effects have 
been incorporated in the model. Most of the models proposed, however, are "single 
shot" models, in the sense that they are required only to handle one task during 
mission time. In addition, few of the models incorporate performance levels into 
measuring system effectiveness. 
Traditionally, besides the operator, a system involves only the hardware unit. 
However, in some cases, systems are becoming so large and complex and time 
constraints so tight that systems operation is possible only through the extensive 
use of the computer. The issues of computer performance evaluation and prediction 
have concerned designers and users of such systems. Until the late 1960s attention 
was focused almost solely on the performance of the hardware aspect of the system. 
Performance of the system in the operational phase, however, depends on both the 
hardware and the software subsystems. In the early 1970s, software became the 
center of attention. This happened due to the continuing increase in the ratio of 
software to hardware costs, in both the production and the operational phases [281. 
Very few studies have addressed the problem of modeling and evaluating the 
failure and maintenance phenomena in the hardware-software system. The situation 
becomes more complex if the human operator is involved, and there is no study 
addressing the system effectiveness of such systems. The objective of this study, 
therefore, is to develop stochastic models of effectiveness for a system involving 
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hardware, software, and human operator and which is required to perform a number 
of randomly arriving tasks during the mission time. This study is a sequel to three 
previous studies: "System Effectiveness Models for Maintained System: Analytical 
and Simulation Approach" by Lie [60], "System Effectiveness Models Via Renewal 
Theory and Bayesian Inference" by Kuo [55], and "Stochastic Models for System 
Effectiveness" by Lee [57]. 
1.7 Contents of This Study 
Chapter 2 provides a review of existing approaches to hardware reliability, 
human reliability, and software reliability. Finally, this chapter reviews the better-
known effectiveness models for hardware, man-hardware, and hardware-software 
systems. 
Chapter 3 develops the analytical model of the effectiveness for a single ma­
chine system operated by a human operator. The machine involves hardware and 
software. The system-effectiveness model developed in this study involves five major 
factors: the task arrival process, the system state, the allowable performance time, 
the system design failure, and the human operator performance variables. Three 
formulations of system-effectiveness are given; each formulation is different in terms 
of how the case of no task during the mission time is handled. 
Chapter 4 develops the effectiveness model for ;V-machine systems. Each ma­
chine involves hardware and software and is operated by a human operator. The 
system is required to perform a number of tasks that arrive randomly during the 
mission time. The human operator of each machine has to perform a prescribed 
function simultaneously with the operators at all other machines at each task ar-
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rival. 
Chapter 5 discusses three extensions to models proposed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The models are extended to handle; 1) systems with multiple operating modes, 2) 
systems with several types of tasks, and 3) systems with general failure and repair 
distribution. For the first problem, the operating levels are assumed to affect the 
task performance. In the second problem, each type of task is characterized by the 
performance level of the human operator representing the degree of accomplishment 
of a specified task. The last extension is considered to handle a more general system 
by removing the assumption of the Markovian process for the system state. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Hardware Reliability 
This section reviews some fundamental aspects of equipment reliability :8,10j. 
Before we begin the discussion, first we will explain the terms component and equip­
ment. The component is a nonmaintained integral item. If a component fails, it is 
removed and discarded from the population under consideration. It may or may not 
be replaced by a new component. It should be noted that this definition does not 
exclude a failed and discarded component being salvaged and repaiired to original 
standards and returned to service, but it then constitutes a new component. The 
words equipment and hardware are used interchangeably to denote an assembly of 
components. 
Now the reliability of a component can be defined as its ability to function 
successfully as required under specified condition. It is measured as a probability 
to function without remedial action to a specified standard, and is dependent upon 
time and phase of use. This definition contains two essential features. They are: 
1) a quality of performance is expected, and 2) it is expected over a specified time. 
The first feature is related to the strength of the component. It is widely assumed 
that the strength of the equipment is independent of time, and if the stress due to 
the load is less than the strength, the component survives; but if it is greater, the 
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component fails. In the absence of adequate evidence on actual distribution, the 
normal distribution is probably the best assumption for the strength and load [8]. 
The load is repeated n times from its distribution, with n being some function of 
time. In this way, time is introduced into the analysis. It has been shown [8] that 
if time is taken into account in this way, reliability drops very rapidly early in the 
operation and afterward remains very nearly constant. It has also been shown that 
this situation is also true in terms of failure rates. That is, the failure rate initially 
drops very rapidly, subsequently remaining more or less constant. 
The explanation so far has neglected all time-dependent factors such as creep, 
fatigue, corrosion, erosion, and so on. Ideally, these could be taken into account by 
making strength a function of time and load. Several mathematical models have 
been built up along this line. Ideally, we would also wish that any piece of equipment 
were 100% reliable-so far as time-dependent factors are concerned-up to a given 
time and that subsequently they would become become 0% reliable. In practice, 
we could hope that the fall of reliability would be distributed over a time period. 
We may suppose that this could be more or less normally distributed. With this 
assumption, a failure rate related to wear-out increases with time in contrast to a 
failure rate that decreases with time in the early life and which remains constant 
for random failures. Concerning wear-out. Carter [8j stated the following; 
Wear out may physically be a phenomenon corresponding to the collo­
quial use of the term in which material is worn away so that clearances 
or stresses become too great for satisfactory use. It may be due addi­
tionally to physical or chemical deterioration, to aging, or to corrosion, 
and so forth. Alternatively, wear-out may be due to fatigue of the mate­
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rial leading to failure, or to creep leading to loss of clearance or possibly 
to rupture. The term "wear-out" thus embraces a wide variety of phe­
nomena, the common feature being a reduction of the strength of the 
component with time. 
It is reasonable to expect that several types of failure may occur in a component. 
If these are all independent so that prior to actual failure there is no interaction of 
one failure process on another, and if the occurrence of a single failure mode implies 
the total failure of the item, the overall failure rate is the arithmetic sum of all 
the individual failure rates. Hence the failure rate derived for nontime-dependent 
phenomena may be added to those derived for time-dependent phenomena, in order 
to give the complete failure rate over the whole life of an item of equipment. In this 
total failure pattern, one can easily distinguish the three broad components; early 
life represented by a decreasing failure rate with respect to time; chance or random 
failures represented by a more or less constant rate; and wear-out, represented by 
an increasing failure rate. 
So far the discussion has concentrated on only the components. But what 
about the reliability of the equipment? Carter [8] has this to say about the topic; 
In practice, failed components of complex equipment are replaced, and 
the equipment returned to service. The population thus remains con­
stant, and we eventually reach a state where the population is made up 
of a mixture of first, second, third, or even later-generation components. 
The higher generations are most likely to be present if component failure 
due to wear-out and the mean component life is only a small fraction of 
the parent equipment life. If the life of the parent equipment is infinitely 
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long, it is readily seen that we should ultimately achieve a steady-state 
where the mixture of the generations is so great that we have, in fact, 
random failure. In this case, the failure rate would be constant. How­
ever, in many cases, the average life of the parent equipment is only 
two or three times the average life of the component, and neither the 
generation failure pattern nor the steady-state pattern can be expected 
to represent the situation adequately. Of more practical engineering in­
terest, however, were the results of some calculations which showed that 
with real complex equipment, the steady-state is reached very rapidly. 
In general, the replacement process applies to minor components, while the 
parent equipment would be subject to normal wear-out. One piece of equipment 
may suffer a number of minor failures due to some causes that could all be lumped 
together to give a random failure pattern. The failure rate could be deduced from 
experience and, according to the steady-state approach, could be assumed to hold in 
the feature with appropriate maintenance. In addition to this, the equipment itself 
would be susceptible to some long-term failure modes, due to some other causes 
which would not have been experienced in early running. Such long-term failures 
would appear as major wear-out. Thus, taking the whole life into account, we 
should expect for maintained equipment much the same failure pattern as for simple 
nonmaintained components. Early life would exhibit the usual falling failure rate 
characteristic leading to periods of more or less constant failure rate associated with 
the normal life of the equipment, and would be followed by a final stage of increasing 
failure rate corresponding to the wear-out phase at the end of life. This pattern is 
diagrammatically presented by a "bathtub curve" shown in Fig. 2.1. Despite the 
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Normal 
working life Early life Wearout 
Time, i 
Figure 2.1: Complete failure pattern for equipment 
difference in their load and strength nature, this pattern can be found either in 
mechanical or electrical equipment [8,10]. The first phase is often hidden from the 
customer since it occurred during testing and commissioning at the manufacturer's 
factory. It is caused by minor errors in the assembly of the equipment, imperfect 
joints, or a few sub-standard component not detected by previous testing. This 
phase is called "burn-in" for electrical equipment and "running-in" for mechanical 
equipment. 
2.2 Human Reliability 
Due to the need for the human to interact with equipment and complex sys­
tems, it has become necessary to extend or modify classical reliability methods in 
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order to assess the various system-related risks. The potential impact of the inte­
grated reliability assessment is more far-reaching than that which is restricted to 
mechanical components. The various techniques and approaches that have been 
offered for dealing with one or more aspects of this problem have gradually been 
and are still in the process of developing to the area of human reliability analysis. 
Dhillon [15] defined human reliability as the probability of accomplishing a job or 
task successfully by a human at any required stage in a system operation within a 
specified minimum time limit (if the time limit is specified). 
Sharit [91] critically reviewed most existing approaches to human reliability 
analysis from the standpoints of both their utility and validity. Broadly speaking, 
he classified them into: 1) the technique for human error prediction (THERP), 2) 
the use of qualitative models of human performance, 3) the simulation method, and 
4) methods borrowing heavily from classical mathematical reliability techniques. 
THERP is generally associated with Alan Swain [101,102]. They are supported 
by Miester [66] and Embrey [22]. The method is presented in details in [103]. This 
technique is primarily used to evaluate system-degradation resulting from human 
error in association with factors such as system characteristics influencing human 
behavior, operational procedures, and the reliability of the equipment. As noted 
by Sharit [91], the technique reflects the belief that only through quantification can 
reduced system reliability be attributed to equipment and/or procedural design and 
increased system reliability stemming from the application of ergonomie principles 
can be accomplished. THERP involves the four steps shown in Fig. 2.2. In the 
first step, the analyst identifies performance-shaping factors (PSFs) associated with 
information unique to the system under the study. PSFs can aff'ect the probabilities 
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Step 3 Determine error rates of each 
Individual human operation or 
group of operations 
Step 4 Evaluate the human error effect 
on system under consideration and 
Moke necessary recommendations 
Step 2 Identify and analyse the related 
human operations 
Step 1 Define the system or sub-system 
failure to be determined with respect 
to human errors 
Figure 2.2: Steps associated with THERP 
of human error and include factors such as task and equipment requirements, job 
and task instructions, stress, level and type of training, and ergonomie design issues. 
The second phase involves primarily task analysis [20], where the operators' actions 
are identified and broken into tasks and subtasks. The development of a model 
at this stage allows PSFs to be more accurately represented. At the third step, 
quantitative assessment and probabilistics methods are applied. The basic index 
of human performance is represented by human error probabilities (HEPs), which 
include incorrect performance of an action when required, as well as the probability 
that the task will not be completed correctly within some specified time interval. 
This information is typically used in combination with expert judgment, where the 
similarities and differences between the tasks are judged in order to determine how 
error probabilities should be adjusted; informal expert opinion is also used some­
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time. In the last step, sensitivity analysis is considered. There is no formal approach 
to this analysis; any approach that allows the evaluation of various assumptions re­
lated to HEP serves this purpose. As the final component of the fourth phase, the 
results of the human reliability analysis are combined with other components of the 
system, through either fault tree. 
Qucilitative approaches to human reliability analysis, according to Sharit [911, 
do not necessarily serve as alternatives to quantitative approaches, but rather tend 
to represent a set of loosely-organized ideas that advocate understanding the types of 
errors humans perform and the mechanisms underlying these errors. The approach 
is discussed in Norman [78], Carnino and Griffin [7], Rouse and Rouse I88j and 
Reason [86] and has been applied to industrial system reliability by Rasmussen. 
For example, see [83,84,85]. 
The application of digital simulation techniques to human reliability analysis 
has been associated primarily with Siegel and his coworkers |96,95]. The computer 
simulation technique utilized by Siegel and Lautman [94] attempted to model crews 
on surface ships consisting of teams of 4-20 members, for the purpose of generating 
systems reliability and system availability information based on integrated human 
and equipment performance. Task analysis, along with information on equipment, 
personnel, etc., provided the input data according to the computer model's logic. 
The model simulates the attributes of individuals and the equipment they operate. 
Variables representing the physical capability and physical workload requirements 
are relatively easy rationalized. Values representing the levels of parameters such 
as aspiration, fatigue, stress, and motion are, however, more difficult to drive [91]. 
Nevertheless, with sufficient empirical data, analyst can generate the precise distri­
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bution from which individual values can be sampled [94]. Compared to THERP, 
simulation methods are more powerful [67]. One reason is that human performance 
can be produced over a number of trials, theoretically allowing for the quantification 
of the distributions surrounding the performance estimates, in contrast to THERP, 
which assumes distributional properties a priori. A more compelling property of 
the simulation technique, however, is its ability to handle the complex interactions 
of a large number of variables. 
Probabilistic risk-assessment tools, such as the fault-tree method are more eas­
ily adaptable to static than to dynamic reliability. For the latter case, especially 
in the case of tasks in the continuous time domain, such as vigilance, monitoring, 
and tracking, it would seem reasonable to approach human reliability analysis in 
accordance with classical reliability theory [50]. Using this approach, the prediction 
of human reliability is obtained directly from the probabilistic model derived for the 
human performance under study. Most models presented in the literature assume 
a constant rate for the human error [3,4,15,16,19]. 
2.3 Software Reliability 
Software is now part of a very wide range of products and systems, and this 
trend is accelerating with the opportunities presented by low-cost microprocessor 
devices. In most cases, the fact that computer programs take over functions pre­
viously performed by hardware results in enhanced reliability, since software does 
not fail in the way that hardware does. As a results of these rapid technological 
advances, there has been growing concern that the system problems have transi­
tioned from hardware to software [53]. This has become manifest in 1) the larger 
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system cost being borne by software development and use, 2) the increased schedule 
delays in system development and production due to software problems, and 3) the 
reduced overall reliability in the field, due to the fact that many system software 
errors are only detected after the system has been put into use. As a result, a new 
branch of reliability called "software reliability" has emerged in the past decade. 
Similar to the definition of hardware reliability, time-domain software reliability 
is defined as the probability of the failure-free operation of software for a specified 
period of time under specified conditions [93]. However, there are some differences 
between hardware reliability and software reliability and these are listed in Table 2.1. 
Software is a collection of instructions written in computer languages. It is also 
called a computer program, or simply a program. Upon execution of a program, an 
input state is translated into an output state. Any program is designed to perform 
some specified functions. When actual output deviates from the expected output, 
a "failure" occurs. Incorrect logic, incorrect instruction, or inadequate instructions, 
which when executed cause a failure, are called "faults." Whenever a failure occurs, 
there must be a corresponding fault in the program, but the existence of faults may 
not cause the program to fail. A program will never fail as long as the faulty 
statements are not executed. 
Much effort have been made in developing software reliability models. In gen­
eral, Lin [63] classified them by either the deterministic model or the probabilistic 
model. The deterministic model studies 1) the elements of a program by counting 
the number of operators, operands, and instructions, 2) the control flow of a pro­
gram by counting the branches and tracing the execution paths, 3) the data flow of a 





Figure 2.3: A typical reliability growth model 
properties of a program. 
Performance measures of the deterministic model are obtained by analyzing the 
program texture and do not involve any random event. In general, these models 
empirically measure the qualitative attributes of software and are used in the early 
phases of the software life cycle, in order to predict the number of errors in a program 
or are used in the maintenance phase for assessing and controlling the quality of a 
software [63]. 
The probabilistic model represents failure occurrences and fault removal as 
probabilistic events. All of the time-domain models belong to this category, such 
as the reliability growth model, the curve fitting model, the failure rate model, the 
nonhomogeneous Poisson process model, and the Markov chain model. 
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The reliability growth model measures and predicts the improvement of reli­
ability through the debugging process (see Fig. 2.3). A growth function is used 
to represent the progress. The commonly-used independent variable of the growth 
function is time, and the independent variables can be reliability, failure rate, or 
cumulative number of errors detected. Several authors proposed the models; in­
spired by Duane [21], Countinho [13] plotted failure rate versus cumulative hours 
on log-log paper to represent the software testing process; Wall and Ferguson [114] 
proposed the Weibull growth model for predicting the failure rate of software during 
testing; adapted from hardware reliability, Wagoner [113] used a Weibull distribu­
tion to represent time between program failures; Yamada and Osaki [121] suggested 
the used of a logistic growth-curve model to represent the cumulative number of 
errors up to a certain time; Nathan [74] adapted the Gompertz model to represent 
the cumulative number of errors corrected up to a certain time; and Sukert 98] 
adapted the hyperbolic reliability growth model to represent the debugging process 
of software. 
The curve-fitting model finds a functional relationship between dependent and 
independent variables. For example, using time as the independent variable and fail­
ure rate as the dependent variable, this model can be used to estimate the failure 
rate of a software. By assuming that the failure rate is monotonically nonincreasing, 
Gubitz and Ott [31] and Miller and Sofer [68] proposed a nonparametric estima­
tion of software failure rate through isotonic regression. By using an e.xponential 
regression analysis, Butner and Iyer [6] studied the relationship between the failure 
rate of software in the operational phase and the system load using an exponential 
regression analysis. 
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Failure-rate models study the failure-rate changes at failure time and the func­
tional forms of the failure rate during the failure intervals. Most of failure-rate 
models belong to the binomial type model; i.e., it is assumed that the program 
contains N initial faults and each fault has the same chance of occurring. The 
Jelinski and Moranda De-Eutrophication (J-M) model which is the earliest soft­
ware reliability model is also one of the simplest failure rates model [49]. In this 
model each fault is assumed to have a constant failure rate. The J-M model was 
modified by Moranda [72] by assuming that the program failure rate decreases ge­
ometrically at failure time and was extended by Moranda [71] to incorporate the 
change of program size during debugging process in the original J-M model. There 
are some other failure rate models, but they are either variants or extensions of the 
original J-M model. See, for example, Littlewood [65], Schick and Wolverton [89], 
Sukert [98j, Goel and Okumoto [25], and Min Xie [69]. 
The nonhomogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) model represents the number 
of failures experienced up to a certain time. The main issue in the NHPP model 
is determining an appropriate mean value function to denote the expected number 
of failures up to a certain time point [63]. One simple class of NHHP models is 
the exponential mean value function model, which has an exponential growth of the 
cumulative number of failures experienced. The models were proposed by Musa [73] 
and Goel and Okumoto [26]. An extension of the exponential mean-value function 
model has been suggested by Yamada and Osaki [121] by assuming that faults 
come from different sources with different failure rate. Other types of mean value 
functions are the S-shaped models suggested by Ohba [79] and Yamada [120] and the 
hyper-exponential model suggested by Ohba [79]. The S-shape is proposed based 
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on the belief that in the early stages of debugging, as faults are detected, more 
dependent faults become detectable. This results in an increasing growth rate. 
As undetected faults decrease, the growth rate slows down gradually and finally 
approaches zero. The hyper-exponential growth model is based on the assumption 
that a program has a number of cluster modules, each module having a different 
initial number of errors and a different failure rate. 
The Markov model is a general way of representing the software failure process. 
The number of remaining faults is modeled as a stochastic counting process. When 
a continuous time, discrete-state Markov chain is adapted, the state of the process 
is the number of remaining faults, and time-between-failure is the sojourning time 
from one state to another. A general Markov process allows transitions to occur 
from any state to any other state. In other words, multiple faults can be removed 
or introduced during debugging, as suggested by Sumita and Shantikumar ilOOj. If 
we assume that the failure rate of the program is proportional to the number of 
remaining faults, the linear death process and the linear birth-and-death process 
are two models readily available. The former assumes that the remaining error is 
monotonically nonincreasing. The latter allows faults to be introduced during de­
bugging. When a nonstationary Markov model is considered, the model becomes 
very rich and unifies many of the proposed models. The nonstationary failure rate 
property can also simulate the assumption of the nonidentical failure rate of each 
fault. Examples of the Markov models are the linear death model with perfect 
debugging suggested by Jelinski and Moranda [49], the linear death model with 
imperfect debugging suggested by Goel and Okumoto [27], the nonstationary lin­
ear death model with perfect debugging suggested by Shantikumar [90], and the 
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nonstationary linear birth-and-death model proposed by Kuo [56] and Kremer [54]. 
Most models mentioned above are concerned with the effects of the program 
structure and with the programming practices of the development and test envi­
ronment. From the user point of view, however, the software is treated as a "black 
box." Hecht and Hecht [44] argued that many conventional software reliability mod­
els are not valid during the operational phase. Supported by the real data, they 
concluded that: 
... failure rate or outage is constant or very slowly decreasing. It is 
not intended to imply that a decreasing failure rate is never seen in 
an operational environment. It is intended to show that a decreasing 
failure rate is not necessary characteristic of software in the operational 
environment, and hence that software reliability in that environment 
may differ substantially from those in the debug and test phases. 
In the operational phase, it is more appropriate to define software reliability based 
on input space, as opposed to time space. It is the input that triggers the software 
error, instead of run time. In the input space model, software reliability is defined 
as the probability of successful run(s) randomly from the input space. For more 
discussion, see [77,82,118]. 
2.4 Models for System Effectiveness 
2.4.1 Hardware System 
Hosford [47] may be the first one to use the measure of dependability to eval­
uate system effectiveness in any system where failure is possible. His work was 
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extended by Finkelstein and Schafer [23], who discussed the dependability mod­
els for a parallel system; and by Mohan, Gar g and Singal [70], who discussed the 
dependability models for a complex system. 
Katz, JafFe and Rosenthal [52] defined an index of system effectiveness, called 
system worth, which combines the effect of both reliability and accuracy. According 
to these authors, accuracies are statistical in nature and are expressed by a bivari-
ate normal distribution. Based on this distribution, the authors obtained accuracy 
probability and further obtained the system worth as the system-effectiveness mea­
sure for the B-58 bombing-navigation system. 
Coleman and Abram [11] introduced steady-state availability as a measure of 
system effectiveness and called it operational readiness. 
Henry [43] suggested improving effectiveness through the availability model. 
To realize a significant improvement, it is necessary to concentrate on the reliabil­
ity, maintainability, logistic, and operational problems which will culminate with a 
significant payoff when improved. 
A RING [2] suggests that system effectiveness includes reliability, operational 
readiness, and design adequacy, and this concept was applied to the radar systems 
and multi-moded system. 
Goldman and Slattery [29] presented a diagrammed system effectiveness model 
which included capabilities, operational readiness, and constraints as the attributes 
of system effectiveness. 
Karmiol, Weir, and Youtcheff [51] presented a simplified system-effectiveness 
model to the re-entry vehicle system; the model strongly considered the interrela­
tionship between reliability and availability. 
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The Weapon System Effectiveness Industry Advisory Committee (WSEIAC) 
for the U.S. Air Force System Command [115,116] established a system-effectiveness 
model that is a joint-probability measure of the availability of the system, its de­
pendability, and its capability. 
Hayward [43] has proposed a quantitative measure of the combat-effectiveness 
of a military force. The effectiveness depends not only on the capability of the 
specified force, but also on the nature of the enemy, the environment, and the 
mission. 
Winokur and Goldstein [119] presented their analysis of mission-oriented sys­
tems. A multi-phase system, which performed a mission at various times during 
its lifetime, was composed of a predetermined number of subsystems, each of which 
were required to perform one or more specific missions. The attributes considered 
by Winokur and Goldstein were reliability, capability, and availability. 
The U.S. Army [81] is concerned with design and lifetime operation of a mil­
itary system so that it can fulfill its mission. They impose reliability, availability, 
and maintainability (RAM) requirements for military equipment on the contractor. 
RAM requirements, however, are quite often not met in the test and operational 
phases of the system. This is partly due to the fact that the RAM requirements of­
ten consider the hardware component. Also important are logistics, human operator 
performance, and environmental effects during the mission. 
Tillman, Lie, and Hwang [109] introduced pseudo-reliability, which is a com­
bined measure of reliability and the level of performance. Whenever the level of 
performance is of primary concern, it appears to be a more practical measure of the 
system than reliability alone. The concept of pseudo-reliability has been demon­
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strated for a combat tank system [109]. The work of Tillman et al. is the first to 
incorporate performance levels into the measurement of system effectiveness. 
Gonzales-Vega, Foster, and Hogg [30] presented SIMULAV, a simulation pro­
gram capable of modeling large-scale reliability systems. The program can model 
the effect of such logistics characteristics as inventory, transportation, and facilities 
on the reliability-availability of the system. The system here consisted of several 
components, all of which could have different failure modes. Each failure mode 
followed a particular failure-distribution function. 
2.4.2 Human-Hardware System 
In most situations, a system is the linking of a human operator and a machine. 
However, all of the models mentioned so far do not consider human-operator effects 
which, in practice, are believed to have a significant impact on system effectiveness. 
The human operator has so far been assumed to be fully reliable, and no provisions 
have been included in the models proposed to account for human-operator effects. 
In practices, however, a large proportion of incidents and malfunctions reported are 
typically assigned to human error or human reîiability. A case in point is military 
systems. Even though the reliability of the hardware components of most military 
systems is high, poor system effectiveness is usually observed in the field due to the 
significant impact of human error [55]. 
Having been frustrated with the inaccuracy of their predicted measure of system 
effectiveness, and having realized that the performance of human operators has a 
definite impact on system effectiveness, system reliability engineers have introduced 
the human-operator effect into their already-developed models and have proposed 
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integrated-efFectiveness model measures of man-machine systems. Recognition of 
importance of human operators, since then, has been growing steadily, especially in 
military-sponsored research and development [58]. 
Topmiller [112] differentiated three major criteria of system-effectiveness: reli­
ability, availability, and maintainability (RAM). Here the human factor was treated 
as a basic problem relating human performance to the major system effectiveness 
parameters of RAM. The mathematical property of "additivity of variance" was 
used to evaluate systematically the human operator's contribution to system effec­
tiveness. 
Leuba [59] indicated that the role of humans in systems is mathematically 
similar to the role of hardware in those systems. Therefore, he argued that the 
models for assessing their role in system effectiveness are already available in the 
current system-effectiveness models like the ARINC's model [5]. 
Gephart and Balachandran [24] modified the effectiveness model of WSEIAC 
to include human-performance measures. They introduced the human element by 
considering the capacity in the WSEIAC model as the product of adequacy of 
personnel and capability of hardware. 
The U.S. Navy model [75] considers both operator and hardware effects in each 
of the three major attributes defined in the WSEIAC model; availability, depend­
ability, and capability. However, it does not present any clear method for combining 
various performance measure from hardware and human operators, except by as­
suming the stochastics independence between these two. 
Siegel and Lautman [95] developed a family of computer models that sequen­
tially simulated the actions and behavior of the operators and maintainers in a 
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man-machine system as they accomplished the tasks involved in mission perform­
ance. Here, the behavior of humans in the system was affected by factors such as 
stress, fatigue, proficiency, aspiration, learning, morale, competence, and physical 
capability. Human performance was determined as a function of a function of the 
above factors. 
Tillman, Lie, and Hwang [110] presented simulation models; and not only were 
the effect on hardware components considered, but the environmental effect and 
human performance factors such as operators' training phase were as well. Under 
the assumption of statistical independence among these element, system effective­
ness was determined by the product of each element. More discussion on the model 
is presented in [60]. 
The system-effectiveness models introduced so far indicated the complexity of 
the relevant attributes, but few of the models have given a comprehensive descrip­
tion. Even if the description is given, there is still a lack of theoretical discussion 
surrounding the issue, and the estimate given may not not even be the probabil­
ity estimate [55]. Recognizing this, several authors have established theoretical 
system-effectiveness models. 
Kuo [55], developed system-effectiveness models via renewal theory. Here, sys­
tem effectiveness was calculated as the product of the availability function evaluated 
at a task arrival-time t; and the reliability function at time t evaluated for a fixed 
time period. Further discussion on this can be found in [111]. The general solution 
found, however, is difficult to evaluate numerically. For this reason, a numerical 
solution to the general model of system effectiveness was proposed [107,108]. The 
numerical approach is very general and can be applied to empirical data without 
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assuming a distribution for the data. 
Lie, Kuo, Tillman, and Hwang [62] extended the model proposed by Kuo [55j 
by developing a model of effectiveness for a system that was required to carry out 
several types of missions. Each mission type was characterized by a maximum 
allowable duration time determining its success. Here, system effectiveness was 
determined by the following four factors: availability at the start of the mission, 
system reliability, effect of the environments, and the effect of the operator. The 
model was illustrated by a numerical example taken from a test of military weapons 
systems. 
Lee [57] extended Kuo's work, which considered only one task arrival dur­
ing the mission time. Lee presented a theoretical system-effectiveness model for 
a single-unit system that was required to perform a number of randomly-arriving 
tasks during the mission time. In order to achieve mission success, the system had 
to be available (availability) at each task arrival-time and, if a significant amount of 
time was required to complete a task, operative at least a period of time (reliability) 
from each task-arrival time. Consequently, system effectiveness was defined as the 
combined measure of availability and reliability at each task-arrival time. At each 
task-arrival time, transient human operator behavior was considered in conjunc­
tion with the hardware-system state. Lee also proposed models that incorporated 
performance levels into measuring system effectiveness and related these levels of 
performance to human-operator aspects. However, the models only handled the 
cases where the task was instantly performed when it arrived, and the effect of the 
degraded system on reliability was not addressed. 
Cothier and Levis [12] proposed a method for evaluating measures of effective­
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ness, by using the command, control, and communication (C^) system approach. 
The method was illustrated through application to an idealized fire-support sys­
tem. in the scenario of the system, the forward observer (FO) receives the initial 
stimulus by detecting an enemy threat. The FO communicated estimates of the 
position and velocity of the target and requested for Are to the battalion computer. 
The mission requirements were expressed as the minimum acceptable probability 
that the system would be defended successfully. The effectiveness of the system was 
defined by how well the overall kill probability met the mission requirement. 
Applying classical reliability to human performance, Gupta and Gupta '32':, 
Gupta and Kumar [33,34,35,36], Gupta and Sharma [37,38,39,40], Chung [9|, and 
Dhillon and Rayapati [17,18] developed the methods for estimating availability, re­
liability, and MTTF for various redundant systems under hardware and human 
failures. The failure and repciir times for the systems followed exponential and gen­
eral distribution, respectively. Laplace-transforms of the various state probabilities 
were derived and steady-state behavior of the system were examined. Availability 
at any time was obtained by the inversion process. 
2.4.3 Hardware-Software System 
Haynes and Thompson [41,42] and Thompson and Chelson [105] suggested the 
use of statistical methods in the specification and analysis of the reliability and 
the availability of hardware-software systems. Total system-reliability was defined 
as the probabilities of the absence of any system malfunction over a given time. 
System malfunctions were identified as being related to hardware, to computer 
software, or to unknown sources. It was assumed that the three types of system 
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malfunctions defined three mutually independent point-processes and that their 
superposition generated the total process of occurrence of system malfunctions. A 
Bayesian procedure was used to obtain an exact expression for the probability-
density function for system reliability. 
Goel and Soenjoto [28] and Angus and James [1] developed a Markov chain 
model to examine the performance of a hardware-software system as a function 
of hardware-software failure and maintenance rates. Their model required that all 
underlying distributions be exponential, that at most one software error be removed 
at correction time, and that no new software errors be introduced during the error-
correction phase. This model was extended by Sumita and Masuda [99] to handle 
the system in a more general context. They suggested a stochastic model describing 
a hardware-software system having a nonexponential distribution. Moreover, in 
their model, multiple errors were allowed to be introduced during the repair phase. 
Stark [97] developed a methodology for predicting the dependability (reliability 
and availability) of an integrated realtime hardware-software system using a semi-
Markov process. The methodology was used to evaluate the reliability of the shuttle-
mission simulators at NASA Johnson Space Center. Although each system had 
many component, he classified its interactive operations into six general states; 
good, hardware degraded, software degraded, multiple degraded, hardware critical, 
or software critical. He assumed each state communicated directly with at least one 
other state, and at least indirectly with all other states. Availability and reliability 
were obtained based on the transition matrix representing the system. 
Iskander and Nutter [48] developed a methodology to evaluate safety and relia­
bility of electrical mine-monitoring systems. The approach used divided the system 
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into smaller subsystems, i.e., hardware subsystems and software subsystems. They 
performed a functional analysis and drew a functional block diagram for each sub­
system. Finally, a detailed subsystem hazard analysis was performed in detail on 
each subsystem and followed by the construction and analysis of a fault tree. 
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Table 2.1: Hardware reliability versus software reliability 
Hardware 
Failures are caused by material dete­
rioration, random failures, design er­
rors, misuse, and environmental fac­
tors. 
Sometimes warning is available before 
failure occurs. 
Repairs can be made that might make 
the equipment more reliable. 
Failure rates can be decreasing, con­
stant, or increasing with respect to op­
erating time. 
Failure can be related to the passage 
of operating (or storage) time. 
Calendar time is a universally ac­
cepted index for the reliability func­
tion. 
Reliability can sometimes be improved 
by redundancy. 
Software 
Failures are caused by incorrect logic, 
incorrect statements, or incorrect in­
put data. This is similar to the design 
errors of the hardware system. 
Software failures occur without warn­
ing. 
The only repair possible is through re-
programming, which, if it removes the 
error and introduce no others, will re­
sult in higher reliability. 
Without considering program evolu­
tion, failure rate is statistically non-
increasing. 
Failures occur when an erroneous pro­
gram step or path is executed. 
CPU time and "run" are two popular 
indices for reliability. 
Reliability can be improved by redun­
dancy only when a parallel program 
is written and checked by a different 
team. 
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3 SINGLE-MACHINE SYSTEM PROBLEMS 
3.1 System Description 
3.1.1 System Definition 
Consider a system that consists of a single machine involving the hardware 
and software in its operation. The system is operated by a single human operator. 
It is required to perform a number of tasks that randomly arrive during the fixed 
mission-time T. The human operator in the system has to perform as many tasks 
in the proper manner as the system demands. 
The system can be in one of the two states on or off, where in the on state 
the system is operating and in the off state the system is down under repair if the 
system is repairable or the mission is terminated if the cause of the failure cannot 
be removed. If the system consists of more that one component, it will be on only 
if all components are on (see Fig. 3.1). The failures due to each component are 
statistically independent of each other and have a constant occurrence rate. The 
time to repair a failed system due to each component's error follows a negative 
exponential distribution. 
Some random amount of time is required to complete each task. If the system 







Figure 3.1; Up and down behavior of the system [ R  =  2) 
the time for performance of the present task or during the down time, then the 
mission to perform the arriving task is assumed to be failed. It is also assumed that 
the system could be down while it is performing the task. In this case, the task 
fails to be completed and the system goes under repair, if it is repairable, and when 
done it is restored to its normal operating condition. Therefore, for each task to be 
successfully performed, the system should be both ready to function (be available) 
at the time of the task arrival and to operate (be reliable) during the performance 
time (see Fig. 3.2). Conditional on these two events, the human operator must 
detect the arrival of the task and perform the task accurately within the allocated 
time limit. 
Failure of any one of the above conditions to be met will result in the failure 
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Figure 3.2: Availability and reliability of the system 
to achieve the correct response for the task. If the system is not available at the 
task request, no action can be taken to perform the task. Regardless of whether 
the system is available at the task arrival, if it fails before the task is completely 
performed, then the mission is assumed to have failed. Likewise, regardless of 
whether the system is available and reliable, if the operator fails to detect the arrival 
of the task, fails to perform the task or part of it correctly, or fails to perform the 
task within an allocated time, then the mission is also assumed to have failed. If 
the operator fails to detect the task, no action is taken; the system requirements 
are not met if the task is performed incorrectly; and the mission is terminated if it 
cannot be completed within some limited time. Since factors such as fatigue, stress, 
and learning will affect the operator over time, the human performance variables 
are assumed to vary with time during the mission. 
I 
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3.1.2 Formulation of System Effectiveness 
The system considered in this study requires the successful performance of all 
the tasks arriving during mission time T. Depending upon the method of dealing 
with the situation of no task, system effectiveness can be defined in three ways. 
If no task-request for the system to perform during the mission is considered as a 
mission success, then system effectiveness, or S E ,  can be defined as 
oo 
SE^Yl NiV(T) = + Pr[iV(r) = Oj, (3.1) 
k=l  
where F T [ N { T )  = k]  is the probability of k  task-requests during the mission and 
qj^ represents the probability that, given k task requests, all of them would be 
successfully performed. 
In some cases, the system may still require the availability of the system even 
though there is no task request. The proportion of time the system is available 
during mission-time T can be represented by the average availability, A(T), as 
follows: 
• M T )  = 
where -4.(<) is the pointwise availability of the system at time t .  For this system, we 
define 
oo 
S E  ^  Y I  Pr[Ar(T) = K ] Q K  +  A { T )  F T [ N { T )  = Oj. (3.2) 
k=l  
If we do not take into account the mission that has no task request during the 
mission time, system effectiveness can be defined conditionally upon the existence 
of task requests during the mission. That is, 
oo 
SB= •£ Pc(iV(r) = Pri'V(r) > M. (3.3) 
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Figure 3.3: The proposed system-effectiveness model 
The difference between the system-effectiveness values from the above three 
definitions will become smaller as task-arrival rates become larger. This is because 
the term Pr[iV(T') = 0] goes to zero as task-arrival rates become larger. 
3.1.3 System Variables 
The proposed system-effectiveness model consists of five major factors: the task 
arrival process, the system state, system design failure, and the human-operator 
performance variables. The system is diagrammatically presented in Fig. 3.3. The 
system state has been discussed in Section 3.1.1. The others will be described in 
the following sections. 
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Figure 3.4: Task-arrival process 
3.1.3.1 Task-Arrival Process The system developed in this study is re­
quired to perform a number of tasks. The number of tasks during the mission 
time T, N{T), is a random variable having some probability distribution; and Tj 
(x = 1,2,..., N{T)) is the random variable representing the arrival time of the ith 
task (see Fig. 3.4). In this study, N(T) is assumed to be a nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process. This means that the following properties are assumed [104]: 
• iV(0) = 0. That is, the system is operating at the time chosen for reference 
as time 0. 
• The number of arrivals an interval is independent of the number of arrivals in 
any other disjoint interval. 
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• The probability of at least one task arrival in a small time interval of length 
At is where A(<) is the task-arrival rate. 
• The probability of two or more task arrivals occurring in a small time interval 
of length At is negligible. 
Under the above assumptions, it can be shown that N { T )  follows the Poisson 
distribution [104]. That is, 
^ - m { T )  i r r \ k  
Pr[iV(r) = k\ = kT-^ = Po[k-MT)\, (3.4) 
where 6 = 1,2,... and rn{T) = X(s)ds is the mean value function of the process. 
The task-arrival rate is characterized by the system under consideration and can be 
estimated as the average number of task arrivals during a unit of time. 
3.1.3.2 System-Design Failure We adopt the concept of system design 
failure in relation to the allocated time limit for the task performed. If a new task 
arrival occurs during the performance of the current task, it may be undetected or 
ignored and is considered a failure because of the inadequacy of system design. 
3.1.3.3 Human-Performance Variables There can be many human per­
formance variables representing human behavior in the system. It is not necessary, 
however, to include all of these variables in the model because not all of them have 
a significant effect on total system performance. In this study, three performance 
variables are included in the model. 
3.1.3.3.1 Detection of Task Arrival In order to perform a task, 
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Figure 3.5: Typical probability function for detection of a task arrival 
form of an auditory, visual, or tactile signal. For example, in the chemical blending 
process, the operator should detect the auditory or visual warning alarm in order 
to take the required action against undesirable results such as the overflow of a 
vessel. The probability that human operator will detect the task arrival can be 
assumed to change as a function of time during the mission (see Fig. 3.5), and can 
be represented by 
Pr[-Y(<i-) = 1] =p(<i), i = l,2,...,jV(r), (3.3) 
where X{t^) has the value of 0 if the operator fails to detect the task arrival and 1 
if the task is detected. The probability, p(tj), is an arbitrary functional form that 
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Figure 3.6: Typical probability function for human-performance accuracy 
3.1.3.3.2 Performance Accuracy The detection of a task arrival does 
not guarantee successful task-performance. The task should be performed correctly 
according to a prespecified order. In this study, performance accuracy is binomially 
defined, that is, as a success or failure, according to the fulfillment of the intended 
requirements. For example, in a military system, if the task requires hitting the 
target and stopping its operation, the operator should follow the specified sequences 
to shoot the weapon after detecting the target. If the shooting completely stops the 
operation of the target, it is considered an accurate task-performance performance. 
The probability of accurately performing the task at time is assumed to change 
as a function of time during the mission (see Fig. 3.6), and can be represented by 
Pr(y(ii) = l|^(<i) = 1] = i = 1,2,.. .,iV(T), (3.6) 
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Figure 3.7: Probability-density function for performance times 
where Y^t^) has a value of 1 if the operation is accurate, and 0 if the operation is 
not accurate. The probability can be assumed to be an arbitrary functional 
form necessary to fit field data. 
3.1.3.3.3 Performance Time The time taken to complete the task 
varies from task to task. The time to complete the ith task, Cj, is considered to 
be a random variable having a probability-density function g(c^). Some systems 
require that a task must be completed within an allocated time limit in order for 
the mission to be successful (see Fig. 3.7). For example, in military systems, a 
target should be destroyed before it is able to attack. The probability that the task 
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be performed within an allocated time-limit 6 can be formulated as: 
(3.7) 
3.2 Development of Effectiveness Models 
The system can be on (available) or oj f  (unavailable) when the task arrives. 
Let us define A/j as the event that the system is available at time and reliable 
during the performance time c^; Oj as the event that the human operator detects 
the zth task and performs it accurately within an allowable time limit 8\ and 5j as 
the event that the task arriving at time tj is successfully performed-or 5j- = 
Also let us define = (<i, <2' • • • ' ^ fc) Sfc = (ci5C2' • • • ' ^ fc)-
Now, given that there is only one task arriving during the fixed mission-time 
T, or •V(r) = 1, system effectiveness can be formulated as follows: 
or for the successful performance of the task that arrives at time ti, the system 
should be available at time and reliable during performance time C]^. Conditional 
on these two events, the human operator should detect the task arrival and perform 
accurately within an allowable time-limit 6. 
In the case of N{T)  =  2, let us assume that task-arrival times are given as 
and ^2 with performance times and eg, respectively. If the second task arrives 
during the performance time Cj of the first task, it is considered to be a failure 
or if + ci > <2i system effectiveness for the system is determined to be 0. If 
SE{ti,ci) = PrlSj] 
Pr^M^  n  0 \ \  
Pr[A/ilPr[OiiA/iJ; (3.8) 
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<1 + Cl < <2, system effectiveness is determined as a function of the success of each 
task. In this case: 
SE{ t2 , ç2 )  = Pr[5in52] 
= Pr[5i]Pr[52i5i] 
= Pr[Si] Pr[M2 n 02l5i] 
= Pr[5i] Pr[5i n M2 n O2I/ Pr[5ll 
= Pr[5i] Pr[5i| Pr{A/2i5i] Pr[02i^l ^ Mg]/PriSii 
= Pr[Si] Pr[M2l5i] Pr[02l^l ^ ^2] 
= Pr[5']_] Pr[A/2iM]_ n 0]_] Pr[02iA/2! 
= Pr[Mi]Pr[0ilA/i]Pr[A/2iMi]Pr[02iA/2]- (3.9) 
Now let us assume that task arrivals are given as ,<2» • • • ) ^ V(T)' per­
formance time as ci,c2,... Define two sets C and D such that 
C  =  ^ i ] \ f <  t i  <  t 2  < ' • • <  ,  a n d  
where Cj > 0, i = I , . . . ,  N{T) .  With the task arrival time ^ 
(C — Z)), the probability of a mission success is 0 because of a system-design failure. 
With the task-arrival time 6 D, system effectiveness is determined 
as a function of each task. Given N{T)  = fc, from Eqs. (3.8) and (3.9), system 
effectiveness can be generalized as 
k  
SEUhCk) = n Pr[A/i|A/i_ilPr[Oi|A/J, (3.10) 
2 = 1 
I 
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where Pr^Mg] = 1. Now system effectiveness can be determined by taking the ex­
pected value of conditional probability of Eq. (3.10) with respect to the joint condi­
t iona l  d i s t r ibu t ion  o f  t he  a r r iva l  t imes  and  pe r fo rmance  t imes ,  g iven  tha t  N{T)  =  k ,  
and finally taking the expected value with respect to the Poisson distribution of 
N{T). That is, 
SE{T)  = £{£[SE(ij,,£s,))}+P<,10;m(T)](l) 
oo 
= Z E [^%,%)| + Po[0;m(r);. (3.11) 
t=l 
Here 
E[SE{ t i ^ , c i ^ ) \  =  J  j  SE{ t i ^ , ç j ^ ) f s { t k , ç j ^ )dc i . . . dc j ^d t i . . . d t i ^  
= j  - j j  J  SE[ t j ^ , ç j ^ ) f ^ , { t_ j ^ )g^{ç j ^ )dc i . . . dc j ^d t i . . . d t ^ ,  
where fs{tk,Çk) is the joint probability-density function of which is the 
multiplication of the joint probability-density function of task-arrival time 
and the joint probability-density function of the performance times gj^(c^) by a 
statistically independent assumption between the two. Since N{T) follows a non-
homogeneous Poisson process with arrival rate X{t), it can be proved that: 
and the joint probability-density function of performance times c^,..., c^, by an 
identical independent distribution assumption, can be determined as follows: 
k  
9k i ^k )  =  n ^ (S)' Ci>0 ,  i  =  l , 2 , . . . , k  (3.13) 
z=l 
To prove Eq. (3.12), let us assume, given that k task arrivals have occurred in 
(0,T), that in each of k nonoverlapping subintervals 4- ..., 
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(number of task arrivals) 
^1 + ^2; *2 + ^2 ^ 
Figure 3.8: Task arrival process 
exactly one task arrival occurs, and elsewhere no task arrival occurs (see Fig. 3.8). 
In such a case, the conditional probability is 
Pr[<i <Ti <ti + hi,.. • < ^iV(r) - ^N{T) ^N{T)^ 
Pr[<i < T i < t i  +  h i , t 2  < T 2 <  fg ^ ^ k \  
Po[k - ,m {T ) \  




n|LiM<i + fez)-m(«t)l 
m(T)&/jb! ' 
By the definition of the density function, the left-hand side of Eq. (3.14) is approx-
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imately equal to 
/iV(r)(^iV(r)l^(^) = ^ )h i ^2  (3.15) 
Therefore, 
As /ij (i = 1,2,... ,fc) approaches to 0, and 
" ^^.0<<1<'2< -<',ST, (3.17) 
where 
\{tl) = lim [m(<j 4- hi) - m(<j-)]. (3.18) 
«i-^0 
Having proof Eq. (3.12), system effectiveness can now be expressed as follows; 
SE(T)  =  g  I  /  J 
6=1 
...dtj^ X Po[t;m(!r)jj + Po[0;m(r)] (3.19) 
Note that SE{tj^,cj^) is a function of availability, reliability, and operator per­
formance at each task arrival. If we define as the event that the system is 
available at time <j, given that the system is available at the end of the [i — l)th 
task performance; and as the event that the system is reliable during the per­
formance time C£, given the availability at time then the system effectiveness, 
given that N(T) = k, presented in Eq. (3.10) can be rewritten as: 
k  
SE{t}^,ci^) = n PrfO^|A/^|. (3.20) 
2 = 1 
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Renewal process 
for the system 
|Cj_i (performance time) 
(on )  
M)  
4 — 1  1 4 — 1  1  I 
I 





Figure 3.9: Adjustment of time 
Given that the system is operating at and functioning during the performance 
time Cj_i, this system is like new at time -r because of the memoryless 
property of the Markovian process. If we adjust the time to time zero 
for a reference point (see Fig. 3.9), then the first term of Eq. (3.20) can be redefined 
as: 
Pr[A i |Mj_ i ]  =  a ( i ^ ) ,  
where = 4 " 4—1 "" Again by the memoryless property, the probability 
of the system is reliable during the performance time Cj, given that the availability 
at the task-arrival time is independent of the system condition before time 
Therefore, the second term of Eq. (3.20) can be redefined as: 
=r(<i,c,-). 
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Given that the system is available at each task arrival and reliable during the 
task performance, it is assumed that the performance of the human operator is 
characterized only by the task-arrival time. Under this assumption, the third term 
of Eq. (3.20) can be redefined as: 
Pr[Oi|MJ = 




and overall system effectiveness can be rewritten as follows: 
X Po[fc;m(r)]} -r Po[0;m(r)]. (3.22) 
The above definition of system effectiveness is based on the assumption that no 
task arrival during the mission is considered one definition of mission success. As 
discussed in Section 3.1.2, if the system requires the availability of the system even 
when there is no task request during the mission, then 
Po[fc;m(T)lj -r Po[Q\m{T) ]  A{ t )d t /T .  (3.23) 
For some systems, missions can occur only if there are task arrivals. For such 
systems. 
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X Po[k\m{T)]^  / (1 - Po[0;m(r)]} . (3.24) 
The Eqs. (3.1), (3.2), and (3.3) in Section 3.1.2 are equivalent to Eqs. (3.22), 
(3.23), and (3.24), respectively, if 
/ A- / 
is replaced hy  qj^ .  
To continue the analytical derivation, we must derive the close forms for a(i^), 
and o(<^,^). 
3.3 Availability Derivation 
Let us assume that the system has R components, with each component having 
a constant failure and repair rate, if it is repairable, and that is satisfies the following 
additional assumptions: 
• The failures due to the rth component's error are statistically independent of 
each other and have an occurrence rate ar. 
• The probability of two or more errors occurring simultaneously is negligible. 
• The repair processes of a failed system due to the rth component's error are 
s t a t i s t i ca l ly  independen t  o f  each  o the r  and  have  a  cons tan t  r a t e  3r -
• Failures and repairs of one component are statistically independent of both 
the failures and repairs of the other components. 
• A failed system caused by any component is repaired back to its original 
operational state. 
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The probability that the system is available at time given that the system 
is operable at the end of the performance of the (z — l)th task, can be written as 
follows: 
~  n  =  i j  I  n  | ^ r ( < i _ l )  =  1 )  T ' J C ' i - i )  >  
r= l  r=l 
R 
= PnQ {Z'('i) = ilM'i-i) = i,r/('i-i)>ci_i}l. (3.25) 
where Zr{ t )  is the indicator variable representing the state of the rth component 
of the system at time < (0 = ojf, 1 = on) and TjJ(f) is the time to failure of the rth 
component of the system measured from time t. Given that the system is operating 
at and functioning during the performance time this system is like new 
at time 4- because of the memoryless property of the Markovian process. 
If we adjust the time time zero for a reference point (see Fig. 3.9), 
then Eq. (3.25) can be rewritten as; 
R , 
= Pr[ n - ^ i-1 - Ci-i) = l}! 
r=l 
= N fl {Zr{ t l )  = l}! 
r=l 
= WZ) (3.26) 
where PQ{ t )  is the probability that the system is on  at time t; - i i - i  
Î = 1,2,..., N{T) \  = 0; CQ = 0. For simplification, the index i  and the asterisk on 
are suppressed throughout the derivation. The differential-difference equations 
corresponding to the system represented by the rate diagram in Fig. (3.10) can be 
given as 
d R R 
jMt) = E APr(l) - E «rfoM (3-27) 
i-=l r=l 
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Figure 3.10: System rate diagram for i2 = 4 
—P7<(i) = arPQ{t) — 0rPr{i)i (3.28) 
where Pr(0 is the probability that the system is o f f  at time i  due to the rth 
component's error. Taking the Laplace transforms of both sides of Eqs. (3.27) and 
(3.28), we obtain 
_ A _ R _  
6Po(a)-Po(0) = E ^r>Pr(s) - E (3.29) 
r=l r=l 
a P r ( a )  —  P r ( 0 )  =  a r P ^ i ^ s )  -  ( 3 r P r { s ) y  ( 3 . 3 0 )  
where Px{s) is the Laplace transform of Px{t)t a is a Laplace transform variable; 
and PQ(0), fr(0) are 1 and 0, respectively, since the system is operating at time 
= 0. Therefore, from Eq. (3.30), we have 
(3.31) 
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By substituting P q{ 0 )  =  1 and the values of P R { s )  from Eq. (3.31) into Eq. (3.29), 
we get 
^ F o W - l  =  l : { ^ } p o W - E « r F o W  
= (3.W) 
so that 
f i  ar .  I - '  
P0(») = • (3-33) 
This transform can be inverted for any set values of ar and ,8r to obtain the avail­
ability of the system a(<j') or fQ(^?). 
3.4 Reliability Derivation 
The conditional probability that the system will be functioning for the task-
performance time Cj-, given that the system operates at task-request time can be 
formulated as follows: 
R 
=  N  [ r j i t i )  >  C j j  I  
R 
Pi |^7'(ij) = l,^r(^î —i) = l,Ty(ij_i) > 1 ji" (3.34) 
By the memoryless property of the Markovian process, Eq. (3.34) can be rewritten 
as 










or time to failure of the iî-component system is exponentially distributed with the 
parameter a, = 
3.5 Quantification of Human Performance 
In the quantification of human performance effects, it is assumed that, given 
the system availability at each task request time and reliability during the allocated 
time, the successful performance of each task is independent of the other tasks 
and that, as discussed in Section 3.1.1, the occurrence of any one of the proposed 
types of human error will cause the mission to fail. Under these assumptions, the 
human-operator effect on task performance can be formulated as follows; 
o{ti,6) = Pr[.Y(<^) = 1,F(<^) = l,c^ < 
= ?v[X{ t i )  =  l \Mi \  
X Pr[cj < = I, Mi] 
X Pr[y(«j) = l|-Y(<j) = l,iV/J 
= (3.36) 
The first term in Eq. (3.36) represents the probability of detecting the task 
arriving at time tf, the second term represents the probability of completing the 
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task within allocated time 6 ]  the third term represents the probability of accurately 
performing the task under some given conditions. 
3.6 Illustrations 
In this section we present the effectiveness model of four human-hardware-
software systems using the approach proposed in the previous section: 
•  Mode l  .4: The model represents a repairable system in which failure due to 
human error and failure due to the hardware are not separated. Also, in 
this model, the hardware includes all software needed to make it work. More 
specifically, when the system fails, a repairman is sent. It is assumed that 
the repairman will be able to repair the failed system. The failure and repair 
rates are and ^2, respectively. 
•  Mode l  B :  In this repairable system, failure due to man-hardware and the 
failure due to software are differentiated. The term "man-hardware" is used to 
represent cases where operator and hardware are treated as a single component 
of the system. When the system fails due to either man-hardware or software, 
a repairman is sent. The man-hardware and the software need a different 
repairman. Both repairmen are assumed to be capable of repairing a failed 
system. The repaired system is put back in its normal operation. The failure 
and repair rates of the man-hardware and the software components are a^, «2 
and 01,02J respectively. 
•  Mode l  C :  In this model, the operator performs continuous tasks involving some 
kind of tracking activity such as monitoring a changing situation. Examples 
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of time-continuous tasks performed by humans are aircraft maneuvering, mis­
sile count-down, and scope monitoring. The modeling concept for human 
reliability in such situations is analogous to classical reliability modeling [15|. 
This concept easily allows us human error from failures due to other compo­
nents of the system, in our case, hardware and software components. As in 
previous models, the system is repairable and each type of failure requires a 
different repairman. The failure and repair rates of the operator, hardware, 
and software are 01,02,0:3 and 01,02^0^^ respectively. 
•  Mode l  D:  This model is the same as Model C, except that solely in the case 
of failure due to hardware or operator is a repairman sent to fix the system. 
A fixed system is returned to its normal operating condition. No attempt is 
made to repair a failed system due to software error. In this case, the mission 
is terminated. 
On inverting Eq. (3.33) with the appropriate r, we obtain the following results 
on the availabilities for the system defined above: 
Mode l  .4: 




,3i + oj 
°1 
0 \+a i  
^1 = 
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Mode l  B :  
where 
) — -Yq + 4- -Y2e''2 i^  ^
-Yq =  
.Yi = 
^2  =  
Si = 





( S j  + 0 i ) { s i + 0 2 )  
n i n  -  ^ 2 )  
i^2 + ^ l)(^2 + ^ 2) 
^2(^2 - n) 
- X I  + \Jxj^ - 4x2 
- X I  - \Jx^~-~Âx2 
2 
= 01  +02  +  ^ 1  +  o t2  
= 0102 + 0^102 + "2/32-
(3.38) 
Mode l  C :  
where 
o(tJ) = Xq + 4- + -^3® ^ ^ > 





{01 + •3i)(/32 4- •si)(/?3 T 31 ) 
•»l(^l - 32)(ai - S3) 
{01 + ^ 2){02 + n){0z + ^ 2) 
^2(^2 -•si)(^2 --53) 
[01 + 33)(^2 + ^ Z){.0Z + 33) 
^3(^3 -•si)(33 -32) 
(3.39) 
•Z^lçfZx) = Sa: 
(Sg7 +  -r  + Sg/ I»  - f  Z£j l0  = Zx 
Z  ^ -\. Ifj + £n + Zv + Ix) = Ta: 
ajat^M 
(Sff 4- y)(Ep + :(/) 
(Ep 
—  2 e ) ( T e  — 2p) 
( 2 s  +  V ) ( ^ ^  + V) 
(B. — T?)(2e 
-M 
'O = Sx + eZx  +  _P%z + p 
6 o 
jo s^ooj aij^ aj% s^-^e pu'B 
(Sp - S?)(Ip - Sp) 
= 
( T ? + T £ / j ( I p + I g / )  ~  
(O^C) = ( |?)d 
•a  ppm 
•Z^l^Zv + Sgflg/go _L Sg/Eg/lo + Sg/gg/Ig/ = Sa: 
(2g/ 4- 4- (Sg/ + l£j)Zio + (Eg/ + Sg/)Tt) -j- Sg/Sg/ + Sg/Ig/ + 2g/Ig/ = Za: 
Sg/ + 2g/ + Ig' + So -f S» + To = Xi  
aistiM 
'O = Ea: 4- e2a: 4- ^elz 4- g? 
JO S^OOJ 31{Î SJ'B pu'B 
89 
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Therefore for Model A, B, C, and D 
(3.41) 
where the first term is from Eqs. (3.37), (3.38), (3.39), and (3.40) for System A,B,C, 
and D, respectively, with Xg = 0 for System D; where the second term is from Eq. 
(3.35) with the appropriate choice of r; and where the third term is from Eq. (3.36). 
System effectiveness can be evaluated by substituting Eq. (3.41) into Eqs. (3.22), 
(3.23), and (3.24), depending upon the definition of the system being investigated. 
3.7 Numerical Examples 
3.7.1 Example 1 
Suppose we have a Model A system with characteristics as follows: 1) the 
number  o f  t a sks  a r r iv ing  dur ing  the  miss ion  fo l lows  a  Po i s son  p rocess  wi th  X{ t )  =  
0.05; 2) the on time and off time of the system follows the exponential distribution 
with means 20 and 1, respectively, 3) mission time has a fixed value, T = 10, 4) the 
allocated time limit for task performance is given as 0.1, and 5) the human operator 
has the following performance characteristics: the probability of detecting the ith 
task is p(tj) = exp(-O.OU^), 0 < < 10; the probability of accurately performing 
the ith task is ç(tj) = exp(—0.02f^), 0 < < 10; and the performance time follows 
an exponential distribution with a parameter of 25, that is, g(c^) = 25e.xp(-25Cj), 
H > 0. 
Using the formula in the form presented in Section 3.1.2, system effectiveness 
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can thus be written as: 
k  .  
SEiiT) = . ^ q^Poik; m(T)] + Po[0; m(T)] (3.42) 
1=1 
k  
SE2{T) = ^çfc/'o[A!;m(r)] + Po[0;m(r)].-l(r) (3.43) 
t=l 
k  
SEziT) = ^%Po[fc;m(T)]/(l-Po[0;m(r)]), (3.44) 
i=l 
where SEi{T) is system effectiveness when no task is considered as a mission success; 
SE2{T) is system effectiveness when the availability is required even though there 
is no task; SE^{T) is system effectiveness when missions can occur only if there are 
task requests; qj^ is the probability of successfully performing k out of k tasks; and 
A(T) is the average availability during mission time T. For this example, 




=  JdI— — ' ^ ' 1 - - . A t .  
Xq =  
o t i+0 i  
31 = -(«1 +/)%) 
«(<-) = XQ +  X ie^^^ i .  
By substituting the values of the parameters for the system in the example, 
i.e., = 0.05,Z?! = 1,A(<) = 0.05, T = 10,r = 0.01,u = 0.02,— 25 and 6 = 0.1, 
into Eqs. (3.42), (3.43) and (3.44), and by performing the integration, we obtain 
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Table 3.1: Analytical and simulation results for Example 1 
Statistics Analytical Simulation 
Ai lO)  0.955 0.941 
Po[0;0.5] 0.607 0.607 
Po[i;0.5] 0.303 0.301 
Po[2;0.5] 0.076 0.076 
Pr[iV(10) > 31 0.014 0.016 
9i 0.823 0.786 
92 0.570 0.580 
SEi {10 )  0.899 0.891 
SE2(10) 0.872 0.855 
5^3(10) 0.744 0.721 
the results presented in Table 3.1. These analytical solutions are compared with 
the results from the simulation. From Table 3.1, system effectivenesses obtained by 
analytical solutions are close to the system effectivenesses obtained by simulation. 
The FORTRAN program for the simulation of this example is given in Appendix 
A. 
3.7.2 Example 2 
Consider the same system given in the previous example except, now the man-
hardware and the software components are treated as different components of the 
system. Therefore, we have a model-B system. The on time and off time of the 
man-hardware component follow negative exponential distribution, with parameter 
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0.05 and 1, respectively. The length of on  time and o f f  time of the software com­
ponent also follows negative exponential distribution with parameter 0.05 and 1, 
respectively. The other characteristics of the system are the same as in the previous 
example. 
Using the same procedures applied in the previous example, we have 
k  
SE i {T )  =  q^ ,Po[k]m{T) ]  +Po[Q]m{T) \  (3.45) 
i=l 
k  
SE2{T)  =  Y ,%Po[k - ,m{T) ]  +  Po[0 - ,m{T) ]A{T)  (3.46) 
2 = 1 
k  
SE^{T)  = E 9A:^o[fc;m(r)i/(l-Po[0;m(r)]), (3.47) 
z = l  
where 
-  J D J  R V { M ^ ( L - E M ^ ) * J B ! }  D C - ^ - - - D C K D T I . . . D T K ,  
0ll^2 
n^2  
(«1 + 0 \ ) { s i  +^2 )  
n i n  -  «2) 
(^2 + /^i)(^2 + ^ 2) 
^2(^2 - ^1) 
- I I  4 -  -  4 x 2  
-II - — 4®2 
2 
02  +  <^ \+  «2 
Xq =  
Xi = 





Table 3.2: Analytical and simulation results for Example 2 
Statistics Analytical Simulation 
>1(10) 0.917 0.888 
Po[0;0.5] 0.607 0.602 
Po[l;0.5] 0.303 0.301 
Po[2;0.5] 0.076 0.079 
Pr[iV(10) > 3] 0.014 0.018 
9i 0.728 0.693 
92 0.526 0.508 
SEi(lO) 0.867 0.857 
%(10) 0.817 0.790 
5^3(10) 0.662 0.642 
+ «1/52 + «2/^1 
a(<|) = %o + .Yie^l*Z 
By substituting the values of the parameters for the system in the example, 
i.e., «2 = 0.05,/32 = 1,= 0.05,/?]^ = 1,A(<) = 0.05,7 = 10,t = 0.01,u = 
0.02,/z = 25 and 8 = 0.1, into Eqs. (3.45), (3.46), and (3.47), and by performing the 
integration, we obtain the results presented in Table 3.2. These analytical solutions 
can be compared with the results from the simulation. As shown in Table 3.2, 
the system effectivenesses obtained by analytical solutions are close to the system 
effectivenesses obtained by simulation as performed by the FORTRAN program 
given in Appendix B. 
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4 iV-MACHINE SYSTEM PROBLEM 
4.1 System Descriptions 
4.1.1 System Definition 
In this chapter, we will consider an iV-machine system problem. Each machine 
involves hardware and software and is operated by a single human operator. This 
system is required to perform a number of tasks randomly arriving during the fixed 
mission-time T. The human operator of each machine in the system has to perform 
a prescribed function simultaneously with the operators at all other machines at 
each task arrival. 
All characteristics discussed in regard to single-machine system in previous 
chapters are also applied to the system proposed here. That is, the system can be 
in one of the two states, on or off where in on state the system is operating and in 
off state the system is down under repair if the system is repairable or the mission 
is terminated if the cause of the failure cannot be removed. The system is off if 
one component of any machine fails to function (see Fig. 4.1). The failures due 
to each component are statistically independent of each other and have a constant 
occurrence-rate. The time to repair the system due to each component error follows 























, Machine 2 
Time, 
t = 0 
Figure 4.1; Up and down behavior of the system [ N  =  2 ,  R  =  2 )  
to complete each task. For each task to be successfully performed, all machines 
should be ready both to function (be available) at the time of the task arrival and 
to operate (be reliable) during the allocated performance-time 6 (see Fig. 4.2). As 
in single-machine problems, the system has to be functioning only for the time 
(< 5) it takes to complete the task. With a relatively small value of 5, however, 
this approximation will not make a significant difference in the value of mission 
effectiveness. Conditional on the above two events, the human operator in each 
machine must detect the arrival of the task and perform the task accurately within 
the allocated time limit. Failure of any one of the above conditions to be met will 
result in failure to achieve the correct response for the task. If one of the machines 




for the system (on) 
g (performance time) 
(off) 
I ' ith task 
j 1 arrival time 
'  '  '  ' '  »  
<1 • • •  . • • •  r  
Time, t (Mission time) 
Figure 4.2; Availability and reliability of the system 
task. Even though all machines are available at the task arrival, if one of them 
fails before the task is completely performed, the mission is assumed to have failed. 
Even though all machines are available and reliable, if the operator in one of the 
machines fails to detect the arrival of the task, or fails to perform the task or part 
of it correctly, or fails to perform the task within an allocated time, the mission is 
also assumed to have failed. 
4.1.2 Formulation of System Effectiveness 
Mission effectiveness for the system is defined in the same way as in Chapter 3. 
The system has three definitions of mission effectiveness depending upon how "no 
task arrivals" during the mission is dealt with. The detail of each definition is 
discussed in Section 3.1.2 of Chapter 3. 
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4.1.3 System Variables 
Before developing the mathematical model, the variables involved in the system 
will be discussed. These are the task-arrival process, the system state, the system-
design failure, and the human-operator performance variables. The system state 
has been discussed in Section 4.1.1. 
4.1.3.1 Task-Arrival Process As discussed in Chapter 3, the number of 
tasks requested during the mission is assumed to follow a nonhomogeneous Poisson 
process. Since the operating state of the system is a time-dependent variable, the 
task arrival characterizes this variable. 
4.1.3.2 System-Design Failure If a new task arrives during the perform­
ance of the current task, it may be undetected or ignored and is considered a failure 
because of the inadequacy of system design. To start performing the task, all 
machines and operators must be idle at the task arrival. 
4.1.3.3 Human-Performance Variables All three human-performance 
variables introduced in single-machine systems are also included in the model pro­
posed in this chapter. Because of human nature, each of these variables varies from 
one operator to another (see Figs. 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5). The probability that the hu­
man operator in machine n will detect the task arrival can be assumed to change 
as a function of time during the mission, and can be represented by 
Pr[Xn(<i) = = Pn(<i), i  = 1,2,..., iV(r), (4.1) 
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where Xn,(<j) has the value of 0 if the operator at machine n fails to detect the task 
arrival and 1 if he or she succeeds; the probability of accurately performed the task 
at time is assumed to change as a function of time during the mission, and can 
be represented by 
Pr[Fn(<j) = i = 1,2,..., iV(r), (4,2) 
where has a value of 0 if the operation is not accurate and 1 if the operation 
is accurate; and the probability that the task will be performed within an allocated 
time-limit 6 can be formulated as: 






Time t  » .  /  (Mission time) 
Figure 4.3: Typical probability functions for detection of a task arrival 
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Time, t (Mission time) 
Figure 4.4: Typical probability functions for human-performance accuracy 
Allocated time 
limit for task ^ 
performance 
Density function 




Figure 4.5: Probability-density functions for performance times 
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4.2 Development of Effectiveness Models 
Let us define as the event that the nth machine is available at time as 
well as reliable during the allocated performance time S\ âs the event that the 
human operator at machine n detects the ith task and performs it accurately within 
an allowable time-limit S\ and 5^^ as the event that the task arriving at time is 






M f  = n ^hn 
n=l 
N  
0? = n ^in 
n=l 
N  
S f  = n Sin-
n=l 
Now, given that N [ T )  = 1, system effectiveness can be formulated as follows: 
S E [ i i )  = Pr[5f] 
= Pr[Mp n 0^1 
= Pr[Mf]Pr[05^iMf], (4.4) 
or for the successful performance of the task that arrives at time all machines 
should be available at time and reliable during the allocated performance-time 
6, Conditional on these two events, the human operators should detect the task 
a r r i v a l  a n d  p e r f o r m  a c c u r a t e l y  w i t h i n  a n  a l l o w a b l e  t i m e - l i m i t  8 .  
For the case where N { T )  = 2, let us assume that task-arrival times are given as 
<2 and <2- If the second task arrives during the allocated performance-time of the 
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first task, it is considered to be a failure, or if -1-5 > fg, of system effectiveness for 
the system is determined to be 0. If 4- f < tg, system effectiveness is determined 
as a function of the success of each task. In this case 
SE{t_2) = Pr[5fn5f] 
= Pri5f]Pr[5^|5f] 
= Pr[5f]Pr[M^nC>^|Sf] 
= Pri;5f ] Pr[5f H A/^ n O^]/  Pr[5f ] 
= Pr[5f ] Pr[5f ! Pr[M^15f ] Pr[0^|Sf n M^]/Pr[Sf 1 
= Pr[5f ] Pr[A/^15f] Prfp^|5f O M^] 
= Pr[Sf ] Pr[A/^I A/f n S f ]  Pr[Ogi A/^1 
= Pr[A/f]Pr;05^iA/f]Pr[A/^lA/f]Pr[0^|A/^]. (4.5) 
Now let us assume that task arrivals are given as • • • i^jV(r)' 
define two sets C and D such that 
C =  | i ^ V ( r ) ^ 1  ^ 2  ^ i V ( T )  —  
^ ~ < ' l  +  ^  <  ^ 2 ' •  •  •' ^ i V ( r )  ^  •  
With the task arrival time € (C — D), the probability of a mission success 
is 0 because of a system-design failure. With the task-arrival time 
system effectiveness is  determined as a function of each task.  Given -V(T) = k,  
from Eqs, (4.4) and (4.5), system effectiveness can be generalized as 
k 
5E(!|b) = n Pi-lWflA/f-ilPrlOflA/fl. (4.6) 
1 = 1 
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where Pr[M^) = 1. Now system effectiveness can be determined by taking the 
expected value of the conditional probability of Eq. (4.6) with respect to the joint 
conditional-distribution of the arrival times, given N{T) = k, and finally by taking 
the expected value with respect to the Poisson distribution of iV(T). That is, 
SE{T)  = £{£[SE((4)]}+f„[0;m(r)|(l) 
oo 
= E[SE{tk)]Po[k-MT)]+Po[0-MT)].  (4.7) 
k=l 
Here 
E [ S E { t k ) \  =  j  - j j  j  
where is the joint probability-density function of task-arrival times ,..., 
that is: ^ 
Finally, system effectiveness can be expressed as follows: 
X  Po[k\m(r)]} - r  Po[0;m(r)]. (4.9) 
Note that SE{tj^)  is a function of availability, reliability, and operator perform­
ance at each task arrival. If we define as the event that the jV-machine system 
is available at time tf, and if we define as the event that the iV-machine system 
is reliable during the allocated performance-time 8, given the availability at time 
then system effectiveness, given N{T) = k, can be rewritten as; 
k 
2 = 1 
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k 
= n (4.10) 
z=l 
By redefining, as in Chapter 3, 
a(lî) = Pr[Af|Mf_i) 
r(ti,S} = Pr[i!f l.-lf n A/f_il 
«(ij.i) s Pr(Of|Mf], 
where a(<^) is the availability of the system at the ith task arrival, given that it is 
available at the end of the (i — l)th task performance; r(tj, 6) is the reliability of the 
system during the ith task performance-time Cj, given that it is available when the 
task arrives; and o(i^,S) is the human-operator effect on the ith task performance-
time: i.e., the probability that the human operators detect the ith task and perform 
it accurately within an allocated time limit S given that the system is available and 
reliable for the task performance. System effectiveness can now can be rewritten as 
follows: 
SB(T) = 
•  • • d i f ,  X 4- Fo(0;m(r)]. (4.11) 
The above definition of system effectiveness is based on the assumption that no 
task arrival during the mission is one definition of mission success. As discussed in 
Section 3.1.2, if the system requires the availability of the system even when there 
is no task request during the mission, then 
FT 
. .  .di jç  X Po[k' ,m{T)]^ Po[0\m{T)] A{t)dt /T.  (4.12) 
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For some systems, missions can occur only if there are task arrivals. For such 
system, 
61 K m(T)l'lk\ '  
X  Po[A:;m,(T)] j / {1 - Fo[0;m(T)]} . (4.13) 
The next three sections are devoted to the evaluation of o(<^), r(t^,S), and 
4.3 Availability Derivation 
Consider an iV-machine iî-component system with each component of each ma­
chine having a constant failure and repair rate, if they are repairable, and satisfying 
the following additional assumptions: 
• The failures due to error of the rth component of the nth machine are statis­
tically independent of each other, and each has an occurrence rate am-
• The probability of two or more errors occurring simultaneously is negligible. 
• The time to repair a failed system due to error of the rth component of the 
nth machine follows an exponential distribution with parameter ,3rn-
• Failures and repairs of one component are statistically independent of both 
the failures and repairs of the other components. 
• A failed system caused by any type of error is repaired back to its original 
operational state. 
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The probability that the system is available at time given that the system 
is available at the end of the {i — l)th task performance, can be written as follows: 
N R ^ 





N R ^ 
= n n {^rn{ti) = l}] 
n=lr=l 
= •Poo(^i)' (4.14) 
where Zrn{i) is the indicator variable for the state of the rth component of the 
nth machine at time t (0 = ojf, 1 = on); Ty^{i) is the time to failure of the rth 
component of the nth machine measured from time t] -PgoCO is the probability that 
the system is operating (all components of all machines are operating) at time t; 
=• t i  ~  ^ i—\ — S,  i  = 1,2, . . . ,  N{T) ' ,  and IQ = 0. This pointwise availability can 
be determined by solving the differential-difference equations corresponding to the 
rate diagram shown in Fig. 4.6. For simplification, the index i and the asterisk on 
t* are suppressed throughout the derivation. The differential-difference equations 
corresponding to the system can be given as 
d AT A 
^^'00(O = Z! 0rnPrn{t) - (4.15) 
n=lr=l 
—Prn(0 = <>^TnPQQ[i) - ^ rnPrn{^)i (4.16) 
where a.. = ^nLl o^rn and Prn(0 is the probability that the system is off  






Figure 4.6: System rate diagram for i? = 3 and .V = 2 
transforms of both sides of Eqs. (4.15) and (4.16), we obtain 
_ N R _ 
•s^OO('S) - ^OO(O) = 12 12 0TnPrn{s) - a..Poo(s) (4.17) 
n = l r = l  
•sPrn('S) — i'rTi(O) = OLrnPQQ{s) — SmPrnis), (4.18) 
where Pi(a) is the Laplace transform of Px(t); s is a Laplace transform variable: 
and fQQ(O), Prn(O) are 1, 0, respectively, since the system is operating at time 
= 0. Therefore, from Eq. (4.18), we have 
= {r=^}^00(»)- (4.19) 
By substituting PQQ(O) = 1 and the values of Prn{s) from Eq. (4.19) into Eq. (4.17), 
we get 
» F o o W - l  =  E  Z  





This transform can be inverted to obtain the availability of the system, a(<|) or 
The conditional probability that the system will be functioning for an allocated 
task-performance time 6, given that the system operates at task-request time can 
be formulated as follows: 
n=i  r= i  
N R f 
n n zm(ii) = i,z™(ij-i) = i,n"((i_i)> 
Ti=l r= l  
N R f .  N R 
= NH n rrci) > «} I n n = i}i 
n = l r = l  n = l r = l  
N R 
= n n Prlrpili) > S'.ZmiH) = 11 
n=\r = l  
N R 
4.4 Reliability Derivation 
= n n 
n,=l  r=l  
(4.22) 
where a.. = «rm-
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4.5 Quantification of Human Performance 
Since it is given that the system operates at task-request time and is reliable 
during the allocated time, that the performance of each operator is independent of 
each other, and that the successful performance of each task is independent of the 
other tasks, the human operator effect on task performance can be formulated as 
follows: 
N 
= Pr[ P i (Xn(ii) = = l,Cj  < 
n=l 
N 
= Pr[ fl {Xn{ti)  = llMj„)] 
n=l 
N 
X Pr| n (=,' < 
n = l  
N 
xPrl n = = 
71=1 
N 
= n Pniti)sn{ti,6)qn{ti). (4.23) 
The first term in Eq. (4.23) represents the probability of detecting the task 
arriving at time the second term represents the probability of completing the 
task within allocated time 6; the third term represents the probability of accurately 
performing the task under some given conditions. 
4.6 Illustration 
As an illustration, consider a 2-machine system where each machine consisting 
of man-hardware and software components with failure rates repair 
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rates respectively, where r = 1,2. For this system, Eq. 4.21 can be rewrit­
ten as: 
_ +/^ll)(-^ +/^12)(^ +/^2l)(-^ + /^22) 
+ X23^ + zga + 0:4) 
_ + ^ 12)(-^ + /^2l)(^ + ^ 22) 
s(s - si)(s - 52)(s - S3)(a - 34) 
where -32) ^3 and ^4 are the roots of 
(4.24) 
4 Q O 
a -r 4- X2^ + X3S 4- 24 = 0 
where 
®1 = «11+^11 + 0=12 "^/5I2 + °!21+/^21 + <^22 + ^ 22 
X2 = «11,^12+.%1"12+ ^11/^12+ «11/521 4-^11021-/3II52I-
0^11022 + 011°^22 + 011022 + "12/^21 + 012^21 012021 + 
°^12022 + 012^^22 + 012022 4" °^21022  ^  021<^22 021022 
=3 = "11^12/^21+/5ll "12/^21+/3ii/3i2a21 ^/5II/5I2^21 ^ 
°^11012022 + 011°^12022 + 011012°^22 4- 011012022 
«11/521/'22 +/5I1Û12/?22 4-/3ii/3i2a22 +/5II/521/522 + 
(^12021022 + 012^^21022 + 012021^22012021022 
14 = aii/3ii/3i2/321 ^/3iiai2/52l/'22+/5II/'12"21.^22 + 
011012021°^ 22 4- 011012021022-
On inverting Eq. (4.24), we have 
«(<-) = Xo + .Yie^l^i%X2e-'2^i +X3e''3'* +.Y4e^4'i, (4.23) 
where 
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X ^  011012021022 
•si-S2^3^4 
X _ {011 +  ^ l)( /^12 +  ^ l)( /^21 + n)i022 +  ^ l)  
3 i ( s i - S 2 ) ( n - ^ 3 ) ( ^ i - ^ 4 )  
^ (011 +  ^ 2)l012 + S2)i021 +  ^ 2)i022 +  ^ 2)  
S2(s2 - SI)(52 - S3)(s2 --34) 
Xo = + ^ 3)(^12 + •S3)(/^21 + ^3)(^22 + ^ 3) 
3 3 ( 3 3 - 5 i ) ( 3 3  -  S 2 ) ( s 3  -  3 4 )  
XA = (^11 + '^4)(^12 + ^4:){021 + ^ 4)(.^22 + ^4) 
34(34 - 3I)(34 - 32)(34 - 33) 
If 0j, i  = /3j,2 = 0r,  then Eq. (4.21) becomes 
PooM = \ (4.26) 
I  r = l  
where ar. = + a^2' On inverting Eq. (4.26) we have 
where 
a{tl) = Xo + Xie^l*i%.Y2e^2^*, (4.27) 
X = (^1 +0l){^l  +02) 
'  ^  n (n  -^2)  
y- _ (^2 +^l)(-^2 + 02) 
'  2  ^ 2 ( ^ 2 - ^ 1 )  
- r i  +  y/x^ -4x2 31 = 
2 
T 
52 - ~^1 ~ \ l^l~ 4^2 
XI = ^1^02 + «1. + 0=2. 
®2 = /5I/52+ai_/32 + a2./32-
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For this system, 
r{ti,S)o{ti,S) = I n Pn(iî)-STz(iî,^)9n(ii)| , (4.28) 
where the first term is from Eq. (4.22) and the second term is from Eq. (4.23). 
System effectiveness can be evaluated by substituting Eqs. (4.25) or (4.27) and 
(4.28) into Eqs. (4.11), (4.12), and (4.13) depending upon the definition of the 
system being investigated. 
82 
5 MODEL EXTENSIONS 
5.1 Systems with Multiple Operating Modes 
In some cases, the system has more than two operating states. These states 
or operating levels may be classified as being excellent, good, fair, poor, or failed. 
These operating levels will affect the task performance. Generally, the human oper­
ator is expected to perform better under excellent operating conditions than under 
fair conditions, for example. In this section we illustrate how the model proposed 
in this study can be modified to handle such problems. 
Let us consider a single-machine, 3-component system, i.e., the system com­
posed of hardware, software and a human operator. The system starts the operation 
in "excellent" condition (all component are fresh). When the system fails due to 
hardware error or due to software error, no attempt is made to repair the system; 
the system will be "off" and the mission is terminated. When the system fails due 
to human error, a repairman is sent, however, this repairman is not expected to fully 
remove the error. The system in this "fair" condition is put back in operation. If 
the system fails, again due to human error, a more experienced repairman is hired to 
bring back the system into its original operating condition. The system is required 
to perform a number of tasks that randomly arrive following a nonhomogeneous 
Poisson process. All assumptions regarding the condition that is needed in order 
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for the mission to be successful that were applied in the previous chapters are also 
applied here with some modifications. The modifications will be explained when 
they arise in the derivation. The following additional assumptions are associated 
with the model: 
• Given that the system is operating at level j  (l=excellent, 2=fair), the fail­
ures due to error in component r (l=hardware, 2=soft ware, 3=operator) are 
statistically independent of each other and have an occurrence rate aj,j. 
• The probability of two or more software, hardware, or operator errors occur­
ring simultaneously is negligible. 
• Given that the system is at level j  before the failure, the time to remove an 
error in component r follows an exponential distribution with parameter 3j,j. 
• Failures and repairs of one component, if attempts are made, are statistically 
independent of both the failures and repairs of the other components. 
For each task to be successfully performed, the system should be available at 
e a c h  t a s k  a r r i v a l  a n d  b e  a b l e  t o  o p e r a t e  d u r i n g  t h e  a l l o c a t e d  p e r f o r m a n c e - t i m e  S .  
Under this assumption, the probability that the system is available at level jj- at 
time given that it was available at level at the end of the performance of 
the (i — l)th, can be written as follows: 
= Pi'(Za(i|) = j,|2»(0) = (5.1) 
where Zs{t)  is a random variable representing the state of the system at time t  




Figure 5.1; System rate diagram 
measured from time t .  This pointwise availability can be determined by solving 
the differential-difference equations corresponding to the system shown in Fig. 5.1. 
The differential-difference equations corresponding to the system can be given as 
^^Ol(0 = /?32^32(0 - û.l^0l(O (5.2) 
•J^PrlW = "rl^Oll^) (5-3) 
^^02(0 = /531^31(0 - «.2^02(^) (5-4) 
^^r2(0 = ar2^02(0) (5.5) 
where PQj(<p is the probability that the system is on at level j  at time and 
P.pj{t^) is the probability that the system is off at time after operating at level 
j; and where a j = 4-a2j j = 1,2. For simplification, the index i and the 
asterisk on is suppressed throughout the derivation. Note that, by the definition 
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of the system, 
P r [ Z s ( 0 = ' l ]  =  ( 5 . 6 )  
Pr[Zs(<) = 2] = fo2(() (5.7) 
Pr[Zs(f) = 3] = 1 - Poi(0 --P02(O- (5.8) 
Taking the Laplace transforms of both sides of Eq. (5.2) through (5.5), we obtain 
^^Ol(^) - •Poi(O) = /532^32(^)-°=.1^0l(«) (5.9) 
^•frl(^) - ^ rl(O) = O'rl-Poi(^) (5.10) 
02(^) - ^02(0) = /331'P3I(^)-^.2^02(-®) (5.11) 
^^r2(^) - •Pr2(0) = «r2-P02(^)- (5.12) 
where Pxi^) is the Laplace transform of Px(<), and s is a Laplace transform variable. 
To evaluate Oj..|]^(ip, assume that the system is operating at level 1 at time = 0, 
or fQi(O), fQ2(0) and P^j(O) are 1, 0, and 0 respectively. 
Under this condition, from Eqs. (5.10) and (5.12), we have 
^rl(4 = {^}?Ql(5) (5.13) 
^r2i^) = {^}^02(^)- (5.14) 
By substituting Poi(®) — 1 a^nd the values of P32(.s) from Eq. (5.14) into Eq. (5.9), 
we get 
5P0l(5)-l = PQ2(5)-a.iPoi(^); (5.15) 
by substituting fQ2(0) = 0 and the values of f g]^(a) from Eq. (5.13) into Eq. (5.11), 
we get 
^^Ol(^) = } ^ 0l(4 - «.2^02(4- (5.16) 
where 
X _ _A2%1=.2 
.Yii = (^31 +n)(^32 + n)(o'.2-^gl) 
a i ( s i  -  a 2 ) ( s i  -  5 3 )  
Y ^ W2I + •92)(/^32 + •^2)(°'.2 + ^2) 
^2(^2 - •si)(^2 - ^3) 
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Solving Eqs. (5.15) and (5.16) simultaneously for PqiI"®) ^.nd Po2(^) yields 
Pn.(s) = (^ + ^ 32)(^+%)(a + «.2) 
5(5^ 4-®2"® ®3) 
= (' + ^ 32)(^ + / ? 3 i ) ( 3  +  a . 2 )  i 7 \  
a ( s - a i ) ( s - a 2 ) ( a - 5 3 )  
P02(.) = + 
s{s^ + xis '^  + 12^ + Z3) 
= «31^3l(^ 4-/332) , > 
3 ( a - . i ) ( , - 3 2 ) ( ^ - ^ 3 ) '  ^  ^  ^  
where 62 and S3 are the roots of 
s^ + xis^ 4- X2S + ®3 = 0, 
where, by defining a.. = a 1 + 0 2, = 0z\ ~ 0Z2-> 
X I  =  a . . + %  
®2 = «.1(0^.2 + /^3.) + 0^.2.%. + ^ 31/^32 
®3 = 0'.1«.2/53.+ «../531.^32-
By inverting Eqs. (5.17) and (5.18), we have 
®l|l(^i) ~ -YQI + A'j^ie^l^î + %21^^^^^ - (5.19) 
° 2 l l ( ^ i )  ~  ^ ^ 0 2  + + - ^ 2 2 ® ^ ^ ^ ^  • ' " - ^ 3 2 ® ^ ^ ^ ^  '  ( 5 . 2 0 )  
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^ (/^Sl + ^3X^32 + a3)(«.2 + 
3 3 ( 3 3 - 3 i ) ( s 3 - s 2 )  
xno = -m&iAz 
3132^3 
JÇ- ^ 0'31^3l(/^32 + -^l) 
3 i ( s i - S 2 ) ( s i - 3 3 )  
Xoo = °'31^3I(^32 + ^2) 
3 2 ( ^ 2 - • 5 l ) ( ^ 2 - ^ 3 )  
Y ^ "3l/^3l(/^32 + 33) 
3 3 ( 3 3 - S l ) ( 3 3  - 3 2 ) "  
Now we drive the availability for the case that the system is operating at level 2 
at time = 0 or Poi(^) ~ 0) •^02(®) ~ ^ &nd Pj,j{0) = 0. Because of the structure 
of the transition diagram in Fig. 5.1, the solutions can be obtained directly from 
the solution for the first case by interchanging the index j of a^j and 3j,j from 1 
to 2 and vice versa in the results for the previous case. That is, 
«ipCÎ) = + 5'21=°2'Î' + V3i.''3'.* (5.21) 










(/33i + •ui)(/332 + ^I)(Q.1 + "i) 
u i ( u i  - U 2 ) ( ^ l  - ^ 3 )  
(^31 + ^ 2)(/^32 -r ^2)(^.l + ^2) 
U2{u2 -  ui){u2 -  u^) 
(/^31 + "3)(/^32 + ^3)(°'.l + ^3) 




t i l ( u i  -u2){ui  - U3) 
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y  ^ f^32h2{hl  + ^ 2) 
U 2 ( u 2 - « i ) ( u 2 - î i s )  
y„ = 0^32/^32(^31 + «s) . 
"3(^3 -^l)("3 - "2)' 
and U2 and U3 are the roots of 
0 0 
+ yiu^ + 2/2^ + 3/3=0, 
where 
yi = a..+/?3. 
2/2 = «.2(«.l + 0Z.) + (^.1/^3. + ^ 31/^32 
1/3 = «.2°=.1/53. + «..%^32-
In order to derive system reliability, let us assume for each task to be success­
fully performed, that the system should be ready both to function at the time of 
the task arrival and to operate during the allocated performance-time 8. Under this 
assumption, the conditional probability that the system will be functioning for task 
performance-time f, given that the system operates at task request-time can be 
formulated as follows: 
= Pr[ n I 
r=l 
n = > <}i 
= Prl n [T' j i . l i )  > 4 I n (Zr(ij) = ii}l 
r = l  r = l  
3 
r=l 
—a - .6 
= e -Jz . (5.23) 
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Note that because of the memoryless property of exponential distribution, the reli­
ability is characterized only by the current level of operation; that is, 
1 2 ( ^ 1  ' =  G  ( 5 . 2 4 )  
^21l(^i'^) = ''212(^x'^) = =e~°-2^ (5.25) 
To evaluate the human operator effect, it is assumed that only the current level 
of the operating mode affects the task performance. Under this assumption, given 
that the system operates at level when the zth arrives, the human operator effect 
can be formulated as follows: 
=  l , C j  <  S l Z s i t i )  =  >  S ]  
= Pr[.Yj.(<,.) = l|Za(<:) = j'r> fj 
X Pr[c,. < > fi 
X  P r [ F j ^ ( < i )  =  l | . Y j \ ( < i )  =  >  S ]  
= (5.26) 
The first term in Eq. (5.26) represents the probability of detecting the task 
arriving at time if, the second term represents the probability of completing the 
task within allocated time 6] the third term represents the probability of accurately 
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5.2: Typical probability function for detection of a task arrival 
Time, t  ' (Mission time) 
Figure 5.3: Typical probability function for human-performance accuracy 
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Figure 5.4: Probability-density function for performance times 
Now, given that there is no-system design failure during the mission, and 
considering all possibilities of levels of performance at each task arrival, system 
effectiveness-given N[T) = A-can be written as 
Jl = l = l U = 1 ) 




Overall system effectiveness can be written as 
'oo 
SÊi(T) = Y. 
i = l  
sBim = E 
&=! 
J D J 
. . . d t j j ,  X  Po[fc; m(r)]} + Po[0; m(r)] (5.28) 
J dJ KiôîTi  '  
tT 
. .  .dt jç  X  Po[k;m{T)]^ + Po[ 0 ; T n {T)] A{t)dt /T (5.29) 
5.3(T) = g|/. 
fel y / m(r)«>/fc! ' 
. . .dt^  X fo[A;;m(T)] j / {1 - Po[0;m(T)]}, (5.30) 
where SEi{T) is system effectiveness when no task is considered as a mission success; 
5^2(T) is system effectiveness when the availability is required even when there is 
no task; and 5!Eg(T) is system effectiveness when missions can occur only if there 
are task requests. 
As an illustration, for N{T) = 2, 
sm) = E E jn sEj \-
j l = l j 2 = l  U = 1  ^  J  
J1=1J2=1 
h=l 32'  
— ^)'S'£?||i(^2' '2' + -^211(^1' ^ )'^^1|2(^2' ^2' 
-^111(^1) ^ )'^^2|l(^2' ^ 2'^) + '^•^2|I('1'^)'^^2|2('2' '2' ^ )-
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The model proposed can be extended without any difficulty to handle systems 
with more than 3 levels of operating mode. 
5.2 Systems with Several Task Types 
The model proposed can be extended to handle a system required to carry out 
several types of tasks during the mission time. Each type of task is characterized 
by the performance-level of the human operator. The human performance level 
is introduced in order to represent the degree of accomplishment of a specified 
task. The term "performance" is meant in its broadest sense and includes the total 
set of usable outputs. Thus, performance may vary anywhere from the maximum 
potential performance of which the operator is capable under the most favorable 
conditions to total nonperformance. 
Let us consider a single machine with a human operator operating the unit. 
This system is required to destroy a number of various tasks (targets) that arrive 
randomly following a nonhomogeneous Poisson process with parameter A(<). In 
order to perform the task, the system must be both available at the task arrival 
and reliable during an allocated time performance S. Within each of the task type, 
various task performance levels of the human operator are defined. A probability 
distribution is defined to represent the degree of accuracy, which is assumed to 
change over time during the mission. The purpose of each task is to hit the target 
and stop its operation completely. Task success or failure is determined by the 
accuracy of firing. Generally, the probability of task success can be expressed as a 
function of the task-performance level. 
Let Z(t)  denote a random variable representing the type of task arriving at 
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time t which having values 1,2,...,m,..., A/. Also let [W{t)\Z{t) = mj denote the 
task-performance level at time t, given that the arriving task belongs to the mth 
type, where W{t) is defined to represent the discrete state of the task-performance 
level at time t. Assume W(i) has L different values, as follows: 




For example, if the task requires that the human operator hit the target, various 
task-performance levels can be discretely defined, depending upon the accuracy of 
doing the task. As shown in Figure 5.5, if the target is hit within the circle C|, it 
can be considered as "perfectly done" (PF(i) = 1); if it falls between circles Ci and 
Cg, "fairly well done"; and if it falls outside of the circle C2 (TF(<) = 2), "failed" 
(PF(<) = 3). The probability that the task performance of the human operator is at 
level Z, given that the task is of type m, may change with time during the mission 
(see Fig. 5.6), and at each task-arrival time 
C2 
TF(f)=2\ Ty(f)=3 
Figure 5.5; Task Performance levels in target example 
I 
ft..J 
Pr[W{ti)=l\Z{ti) = m] 
Pr[W(ij) = 2\Z{ti) = m] 
?T[ W { i i ) = L \ Z ( t i)=m 
*1 "" H ^N{T) Time,/ 
.Figure 5.6: Probability of performing at level I when the task is type m 
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Figure 5.7: Probability of task success, given task performance level I 
L 
Pr[T'F(<j-) = l\Z(t^) = m] = 1, / = 1,2,..., Zr. (5.31) 
/=1 
Success or failure of the task is determined by the task performance level of the 
human operator. Let Q{1,6) denote the probability of the task's being successfully 
performed within an allocated time 6, given a task performance level I (see Fig. 5.7). 
That is, 
Cl(l,6) = Pr[successjï'F(<^) = /]. (5.32) 
In the target analogy, a successful task is to hit the target and to stop its operation 
completely. As the distance between the center of the target and the location that 
the spot actually hits grows bigger, the chance for task success becomes smaller. 
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The probability of successfully performing task of type m can be express as; 
L 
Pr[W^(tj) = = Tn]n(Z,^). (5.33) 
/ = 1 
Given that the system is available at time tj and reliable during the allocated 
performance-time, the probability of task success can be expresses as 
M ( L ] 
o(tiJ) = 2: 2:PrlW(ii)  = !|Z(i,) = m |n( i . i )U™{ii) ,  (5.34) 
m=l W=1 J 
where $m(<^) = Pr[Z(ij-) = m]. Now, the same procedure outlined in Chapter 3 
for determining overall mission-effectiveness SE{T) can be adopted. That is, 
5&(T) = y If r 
èiV m(r)V« ^ 
... dif^ X Po[k] m(T)]| + Po[0; m(T)] (5.35) 
tT 
.. .dij^ X Po[k',Tn{T)\^ + Po[0]m{T)] A{t)dtlT (5.36) 
SE,m - Z[JoJ 14  ^
...dtf^x Po[k',m{T)]^ / {1 - Po[0;m(T)]} , (5.37) 
where SEi{T) is system effectiveness when no task is considered as a mission success; 
SE2{T) is system effectiveness when the availability is required even though there 
is no task; and SE^{T) is system effectiveness when missions can occur only if there 







Figure 5.8: A complete cycle of on and ojf times 
5.3 Systems with General Failure and Repair Distributions 
The models proposed require that the underlying distribution for Ton and 
Tgjj! be exponential. If this assumption is removed, the models can handle a more 
general system. For a single component system, the problem can be handled using 
the approach developed by Kuo [55]. He evaluated the reliability and the availability 
of a single reparable system via the renewal theory approach under the following 
assumptions: 
• The on time, Ton, and the ojf time, have a general distribution function 
Fon{t) and respectively (see Fig. 5.8). 
• A complete cycle time, Tc{t), which is equal to the addition of Ton and T^  ^
is also a random variable with Fc{t) as its distribution function. 
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Using the notations already introduced, the probability that the system is 
available at time and reliable during the performance time Cj, given that the 
system is available at the end of the (i — l)th task performance, can be written as 
follows: 
= PrlZi(ij) = l,rj(i;) > > {] 
= Pr[Zi(tJ) = llxPr[T}(i?)>CiiZi(iJ) = ll. (5.38) 
By removing the assumption of a Poisson process, Eq. (5.38) can be represented 
by a renewal equation, where [108]: 
rt* 
4(1,cj = ^ + Ci - u)dFc{u) T 1 - Fon{ti + Cj). (5.39) 
A renewal solution to Eq. (5.39) is [108]: 
^ - Fon{ti + c^) + [I - FonitJ - Ci - u)]dm{u), (5.40) 
where Fcit^) and Fon{t*) are the distribution function of random variable Tc(<) and 
Ton, respectively, at time t*\ and m{u) is the expected number of renewals at time 
u. The expected number of renewals is determined by the cycle time-the sum of Ton 
and TQJ^. Therefore, both Fan and m(u) can be estimated either parametrically or 
nonparametrically [107,108]. By removing the Markovian assumption of the system 
state, effectiveness for the system defined in Chapter 3 can be written as follows; 
X Po[fc;"i(î')]} + •Po[0;m(r)] (5.41) 
...dtj^x Po[k-,miT)\] + Po[0 \miT)]J^ A{t)dtlT (5.42) 
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. X Po[k]m{T)\^ / {1 - Po[0; m{T)\} , (5.43) 
where SEi{T) is system effectiveness when no task is considered as a mission success; 
SE2{T) is system effectiveness when the availability is required even though there 
is no task; and SE^{T) is the system effectiveness when missions can occur only if 
there are task requests. 
References [107] and [108] illustrate the procedure to evaluate the estimate 
and give the close form of the equations when the cycle time and the on 
time are gamma-distributed, with a positive-integer shape parameter, that is, 
frit) = 
0, t  < 0 
(3.44) 
^Ton^^) = (5.45) 
, > 0  
0, / < 0, 





ft* fiw~l "1 
^ I Poll] X{ti + Cj - u)l I 
oo 
^ Po[qv - ^ du. 
.9=1 
For the sake of illustration, let and Ton both be exponentially distributed 
with parameter 7. Therefore, Tc{t), which is Ton + has a gamma-distribution 
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function with v = 2 and ^ = 7  [46]. Under this assumption, therefore, 




= e-7(^I+':z) J i^ -e-27«)/2}ci« 
= + le-'^^^i-^H) j^i {e7^ - du 
= - 2 + e"^*! 
= e-7(<^+Cz) + ig-T'S - e-7(<Z+cJ ^ ^-7^ 
2 2 
du 
I 2 2 
which agrees with c^) for Model A in Section 3.6 if we set = ,3^ = 7. 
Also note that, 
«(fî) = /^(<î,o) 
and 
k((f,0) 
= e - f H .  
The general solution to the problem of system effectiveness proposed here is 
difficult to evaluate numerically even by assuming gamma distributions with a pos­
itive integer-shape parameter for the on time and the off time. If the assumption 
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of gamma distributions were removed, the analytical solution would be extremely 
difficult to obtain. Kuo [55] proposed a numerical solution for h{t,x). The numeri­
cal approach is very general and can be applied to empirical data without assuming 
the distribution for the data. 
The problem becomes more complicated and difficult if the system consists of 
more than one components. One possible approach is to superimpose the failure and 
repair processes. The system on time and off time would be obtained by combining 
observations of all components involved. In other words, it would be regarded as a 
complete unit. 
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6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The objective of this study has been to develop stochastic models for the system 
involving hardware, software, and human operator and which is required to perform 
a number of randomly arriving tasks during a fixed mission time. The models were 
developed in Chapters 3 and 4 for single-machine and jV-machine problems, re­
spectively. It combines the following performance measures from human, hardware, 
and software components: 1) the availability of man-hardware-software system at 
task request time, 2) the reliability of the man-hardware-software system during 
the performance time or an allocated time limit for the performance time, 3) the 
human performance variables, and 4) the system design failure. 
A level of operating mode was introduced to account for situation in which the 
man-hardware-software system may not have failed but is operating at less than 
peak performance. The model is based on the concept that the level of operating 
mode will affect the task performance of the operator and the reliability of the 
system. 
The model was extended to handle systems required to carry out several type of 
tasks during the mission time. Under each type of task, the analytical expression for 
operator performance was differently defined. A further possible extension would 
be to give a priority to each type of task. In such case, a task in the process being 
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performed would have a possibility of being replaced when a task with priority 
arrive. 
Another extension was made to handle the systems with general failure and 
repair distribution. The model was developed for a single-component machine. The 
problem become more difficult if the system consists of more than one components. 
One possible approach is to superimpose the failure and repair process. Another 
possibility is to apply simulation technique. This technique will be able to handle 
more complex systems based on the basic systematical approach develop in this 
study. 
Throughout this study, no reference was made for time dimension but it was 
implicitly assume that the clock time was used. Therefore the time could be in 
second, minute, hour, day, week, etc. depending upon the system being investigated 
The important thing is that they are must be consistent throughout the analysis. 
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9 APPENDIX A: PROGRAM I 




C alfal 1/alfal = average machine running time 
C beta! 1/betal = average machine down time 
C busyl 1 (machine busy), 0 (machine down) 
C detpar parameter for detection probabilities 
C seed seed for random number generator 
C eventi type of failure (if any-see SUBROUTINE check) 
C ftype failure-type frequencies 
C freq(i,l) number of missions with i tasks 
G freq(i,2) number of successful missions with i tasks 
C iunit output unit number 
C lambda arrival rate 
C mission current mission number 
C mstime maximum service time 
C mu service rate 
C nmiss total number of missions 
C nulmiss number of missions without tasks 
C perpar parameter for performance probabilities 
C stal 1 (machine up), 0 (machine down) 
C sucmiss number of successful missions 
C tarriv arrival time 
C tavail total time that machine is available 
C tbusyl time when machine change from busy to idle (vv) 
C tstal time when machine change from ON to OFF (vv) 
C ttotal mission duration 
C 
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C Variable declaration: 
C 
REAL alf al ,betal ,detpcir,lambda,mstime,mu,perpar 
REAL tarriv,tavail,tbusyl,tstal,ttotal 
INTEGER ftype(lO),freq(51,2) 
INTEGER busyl ,eveiitl,mission,narriv,iuniss 
INTEGER nulmiss,stal,sucmiss,iunit 












fcause(l) = ' Machine down 
fcause(2) = ' Machine Busy 
fcause(3) = ' Task not detected 
fcause(4) = ' Task not perf. well 
fcause(5) = ' Task too long 
fcause(6) = ' SUCCESSFUL MISSION 
C 
C Begin simulation 
C 
sucmiss = 0 
jiulmiss = 0 
tavail = 0.0 
DO 1000 mission = 1,nmiss 
tstal = 0.0 
stal = 0 
tbusyl = 0.0 
busyl = 0 
event1 = 6 
narriv = 0 
tarriv = -ALOG(RND(seed))/lambda 
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Determine whether this mission contains any tasks or not 
IF(tarriv .GT. ttotal) THEN 
nulmiss = nulmiss+1 






IFCtarriv .LE. ttotal) THEN 
Determine machine status (ON/OFF) at the arrival time 
IF(tarriv .GT. tstal) THEN 
CALL mupdateCalfal,betal,stal,tstal, 
tavail,ttotal,seed) 
tbusyl = tstal 
bnsyl = 0 
GOTO 600 
ENDIF 
Determine if task will be completed (eventl=6) 
CALL checkCevent1,stal,tstal,busy1,tbusyl, 
detpar,perpar,mu,mst ime,tarriv,seed) 
If task was not completed then determine the number of 
tasks & consider the next mission 
IF(event1 .NE. 6) THEN 
IFCtarriv .LE. ttotal) THEN 
tarriv = tarriv-ALOG(RND(seed))/lambda 









C Task completed, consider next task 
C 
tarriv = tarriv-ALOG(RND(seed))/lambda 
narriv = narriv+1 
IF(tarriv .GT. tbusyl) THEN 
busyl = 0 






C Mission completed, collect statistics 
C 
900 IF(narriv .GT. 50) narriv = 51 
ftype(eventl) = ftype(eventl)+l 
IF(narriv .GT. 0) THEN 
freq(narriv,l) = freq(narriv,l)+l 
IF(eventl .EQ. 6) freq(narriv,2) = freq(narriv,2)+l 
ENDIF 
C 
C If a simulation run completed, print a report 
C 



















DOUBLE PRECISION seed 
CHARACTER*45 msg(15),fInm 
msg(l) = ' Man-Machine System Simulation 
msg(2) = 'Enter seed for random number generator = 
msg(3) = 'Enter total number of simulation runs = 
msg(4) = 'Enter mission duration, T = 
msg(5) = 'Enter machine breakdown rate, Alpha = 
msg(6) = 'Enter machine repair rate, Beta = 
msg(7) = 'Enter service rate, Mu = 
msg(8) = 'Enter maximum allocated service time,U = 
msg(9) = 'Enter arrival rate. Lambda = 
msg(lO) = 'Enter detection-prob. parameter, D = 
msg(ll) = 'Enter performance-prob. parameter, P = 
msg(12) = 'A positive input is required ! RE-ENTER 




















luniss = iuniss*50 
25 WRITE(*,10) msg(4) 
READC*,*) ttotal 





30 WRITEC*,10) msgCS) 
READC*,*) alfal 





35 WRITEC*,10) msgCe) 
READC*,*) betal 





40 WRITEC*,10) msgC7) 
READC*,*) mu 





45 WRITEC*,10) msgCS) 
READC*,*) mstime 






50 WRITE(*,10) msgO) 
READ(*,*) lambda 





55 WRITE(*,10) msg(lO) 
READ(*,*) detpar 





60 WRITEC*,10) msgCll) 
READC*,*) perpar 








DO 100 i = 110 
ftypeCi) = 0 
100 CONTINUE 
C 
iunit = 6 





+ ftype.f cause,ntype,ill) 
C 
C This subroutine computes the measures of effectiveness and 
















ttl=' Breakdown by Number of Jobs per Mission 
tt2=' Absolute Frequencies Relative Frequencies 
tt3='Jobs/mission Total Successful Total Successful 
tt4='====================================================== 
tt5=' Breakdown by Cause of the Failure 
tt6=' Failure Cause Abs. Frequency Rel. Frequency 
k = 0 
totmiss = nulmiss 
sucmiss = 0 
DO 100 i = l.nfreq 
totmiss = totmiss+freq(i,l) 
sucmiss = sucmiss+freq(i,2) 
IFCfreqCi.l) .NE. 0) k = i 
100 CONTINUE 
failmiss = totmiss-sucmiss-nulmiss 
avail = tavai/(ttotal*totraiss) 
effl = FLOAT(sucmiss+nulmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
eff2 = FLOAT(sucmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss-nulmiss) 
eff3 = (sucraiss+nulmiss*avail)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
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WRITECiu,#) 
WRITE(iu,35)' Man-Machine System Simulation' 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,35)' Final Report ' 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,20)'Total number of missions ; ' .totmiss 
WRITE(iu,20)'Total number of successful missions:,sucmiss 
WRITE(iu,20)'Total number of failed missions: ',failmiss 
WRITE(iu,20)'Number of missions without any task:..',nulmiss 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Availability '.avail 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Effec.l ',effl 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Effec.2 ',eff2 







fl = FLQAT(nulmiss)/FLQAT(totmiss) 
WRITE(iu,40) 0,nulmiss,nulmiss,f1,f1 
DO 200 i = l,k 
f1 = FLQAT(freq(i,l))/FLOAT(totmiss) 









DO 400 i = l,ntype 














C This subroutine computes the measures of effectiveness and 










k = 0 
totmiss = nulmiss 
sucmiss = 0 
DO 100 i = l.nfreq 
totmiss = totmiss+freq(i,l) 
sucmiss = sucmiss+freq(i,2) 
IF(freq(i,l) .NE. 0) k = i 
100 CONTINUE 
nrepoxt = totmiss/50 
failmiss = totmiss-sucmiss-nulmiss 
avail = tavai/(ttotal*totmiss) 
effl = FLOAT(sucmiss+nulmiss)/FLOAT(totraiss) 
eff2 = FLQAT(sucmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss-nulmiss) 
eff3 = (sucmiss+nulmiss*avail)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
C 
IF(nreport .EQ. 1) THEN 
ttl=' Man-Machine System Simulation 
tt2='Mission No. Avail. SEl SE2 SE3' 


















Subroutine to display parameters for simulation 
REAL ttotal.alfal ,betal ,instime,mu, lambda, detpar 
REAL perpar,t arriv 
INTEGER nmiss,iu 















Man-Machine System Simulation 
Simulation Parameters 
Random number generator seed = 
Total time per mission (T) = 
Total number of missions = 
Machine repair rate (Beta) = 
Machine breakdown rate (Alpha) = 













Max. allocated service time (U) 
Arrival rate (Lambda) 
Detection-prob. parameter (D) 












c This procedure updates the machine status 
c Parameters : 
c 1/alfa mean up time 
c 1/beta mean down time 
c seed seed for random number generator 
c sta 0 (machine down), 1 (machine up) 
c tavai total time that machine is available 
c tsta time at which next status change will 
c 
c 





DOUBLE PRECISION seed 
sta = 1-sta 
rate = (l-sta)*beta+sta*alfa 
t = AMINl(-ALOG(RND(seed))/rate,ttotal-tsta) 
tsta = tsta+t 
















































1 (machine busy), 0 (machine down) 
parameter for detection probabilities 
seed for random number generator 
indicates failure type: 
1 = Machine down 
2 = Machine busy 
3 = Task not detected 
4 = Task not performed accurately 
5 = Service time too long 
6 = Task accomplished successfully 
maximum service time 
service rate 
parameter for performance probabilities 
1 (machine up), 0 (machine down) 
arrival time 
time when machine change from busy to idle (vv) 
time when machine change from ON to OFF (vv) 





DOUBLE PRECISION seed 
Check machine status 
IF(sta .EQ. 0) THEN 
event = 1 
RETURN 
ENDIF 
IF(busy .EQ. 1) THEN 
event = 2 
RETURN 
ENDIF 




p = EXP(-detpar*tarriv) 
IF(RND(seed) .GT. p) THEN 




p = EXP(-perpar*tarriv) 
IF(RND(seed) .GT. p) THEN 




C Check allocated time for task 
C 
stime = -ALQG(RHD(seed))/mu 
tcomp = tarriv+stime 
IF((stime .GT. mstime) .OR. (tcomp .GT. tsta)) THEN 




C Task performed successfully 
C (Machine will be busy until time "tcomp") 
C 
busy = 1 
tbusy = tcomp 
event = 6 
RETURN 
END 
Task detected ? 
Task performed well? 
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10 APPENDIX B: PROGRAM II 
c 
(3 
Program to simulate Example 2 
C Variables : 
V 
c alfal 1/alfal = average running time for hardware 
c betal l/betal = average down time for hardware 
G alf a2 l/alfa2 = average running time for software 
C beta2 l/beta2 = average down time for software 
C busy 1 (machine busy), 0 (machine down) 
C detpar parameter for detection probabilities 
C seed seed for random number generator 
C event type of failure (if any-see SUBROUTINE check) 
C ftype failure-type frequencies 
C freq(i,l) number of missions with i tasks 
G freq(i,2) number of successful missions with i tasks 
C iunit output unit number 
C lambda arrival rate 
C mission current mission number 
C mstime maximum service time 
C mu service rate 
C nmiss total number of missions 
C nulmiss number of missions without tasks 
C perpar parameter for performance probabilities 
C sta 1 (machine up), 0 (machine down) 
c stal 1 (hardware up), 0 (hardware down) 
c sta2 1 (software up), 0 (software down) 
c sucmiss number of successful missions 
c tarriv arrival time 
c tavai total time that machine is available 
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tbusy time when machine change from busy to idle (vv) 
tsta time when machine chauige from ON to OFF (vv) 
tstal time when haurdware change from ON to OFF (vv) 
tsta2 tine when software change from ON to OFF (vv) 























Task not detected 
Task not perf. well 
Task too long 
SUCCESSFUL MISSION 
Begin simulation 
sucmiss = 0 
nulmiss = 0 
tavai = 0.0 
DO 1000 mission = 1,nmiss 
tstal = 0.0 
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stal = 0 
CALL component(alfal,betal,stal,t stal,ttotal,seed) 
tsta2 =0.0 
sta2 = 0 
CALL component(alfa2,beta2,sta2,tsta2,ttotal,seed) 
tsta = AMINlCtstal,tsta2) 
Sta = stal*sta2 
tavai = tavai+tsta*sta 
tbusy = 0.0 
busy = 0 
event = 6 
narriv = 0 
tarriv = -ALOG(RND(seed))/lambda 
Determine whether this mission contains any tasks or not 
IF(tarriv .GT. ttotal) THEN 
nulmiss = nulmiss+1 






IF(tarriv .LE. ttotal) THEN 
Determine machine status (ON/OFF) at the arrival time 
IF(tarriv .GT. tsta) THEN 
CALL system(stal,sta2,tstal,tsta2,sta,tsta,tavai, 
tavai,alfal,alfa2,betal,beta2,ttotal,seed) 
tbusy = tsta 
busy = 0 
GOTO 600 
ENDIF 





C If task was not completed then determine the number of 
C tasks & consider the next mission 
C 
IF(event .NE. 6) THEN 
800 IF(tarriv .LT. ttotal) THEN 
tarriv = tarriv-ALOG(RND(seed))/lambda 








C Task completed, consider next task 
C 
tarriv = tarriv-ALQG(RND(seed))/lambda 
narriv = narriv+1 
IF(tarriv ,GT. tbusy) THEN 
busy = 0 






C Mission completed, collect statistics 
C 
900 IF(narriv .GT. 50) narriv = 51 
ftype(event) = ftype(event)+l 
IF(narriv .GT. 0) THEN 
freq(narriv,1) = freq(naa:riv,i)+l 
IF(event .EQ. 6) freq(narriv,2) = freq(narriv,2)+l 
ENDIF 
C 
C If a simulation run completed, print a report 
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C 




















C Subroutine to read in parameters for simulation 
C 
REAL ttotal,alfal.betal,mstime,mu,lambda,detpar 
REAL perpar,alfa2,beta2 . 
INTEGER ftype(15),nmiss,iunit 
DOUBLE PRECISION seed 
CHARACTER*45 msg(l5),flnm 
C 
msg(l) = ' Man-Machine System Simulation ' 
msg(2) = 'Enter seed for random number generator = 
msg(3) = 'Enter total number of simulation runs = 
msg(4) = 'Enter mission duration, T = 
msg(5) = 'Enter hardware breakdown rate, Alphal = 
rasg(6) = 'Enter hardware repair rate, Betal = 
msg(7) = 'Enter service rate, Mu = 
rasg(8) = 'Enter maximum allocated service time, U = 
rasg(9) = 'Enter surrival rate. Lambda = 
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insg(lO) = 'Enter detection-prob. parameter, D = 
msg(ll) = 'Enter performance-prob. parameter, P = 
msg(12) = 'A positive input is required ! RE-ENTER 
msg(13) = 'Enter output filename '= 
msg(14) = 'Enter software breakdown rate, Alpha2 = 



















nmiss = nmiss*50 
WRITEC*,10) msg(4) 
READ(*,*) ttotal 













32 . WRITE(*,10) rasg(6) 
READ(*,*) betal 





35 WRITE(*,10) msg(14) 
READ(*,*) alfa2 





37 WRITE(*,10) msg(15) 
READ(*,*) beta2 





40 WRITE(»,10) msg(7) 
READ(*,*) irni 





45 WRITE(*,10) msg(8) 
READ(*,*) mstime 





50 WRITE(*,10) rnsgO) 
READ(*,*) lambda 
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55 WRITE(*,10) msg(lO) 
READ(*,*) detpar 





60 WRITEC*,10) msg(ll) 
READC*,*) perpar 








DO 100 i = 110 
ftypeCi) = 0 
100 CONTINUE 
G 
iunit = 6 






SUBROUTINE report Cnulmiss,tavai,ttotal,freq,nfreq, 
+ ftype,fcause,ntype.iu) 
C 
C This subroutine computes the measures of effectiveness and 






























ttl=' Breakdown by Number of Jobs per Mission 
tt2=' Absolute Frequencies Relative Frequencies 
tt3='Jobs/mission Total Successful Total Successful 
tt4='====================================================== 
tt5=' Breakdown by Cause of the Failure 
tt6=' Failure Cause Abs. Frequency Rel. Frequency 
k = 0 
totmiss = nulmiss 
sucmiss = 0 
DO 100 i = l.nfreq 
totmiss = totmiss+freq(i,l) 
sucmiss = sucmiss+freq(i,2) 
IF(freq(i,l) .NE. 0) k = i 
CONTINUE 
failmiss = totmiss-sucmiss-nulmiss 
avail = tavai/(ttotal*totmiss) 
effl = FLQAT(sucmiss+nulmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
eff2 = FLOAT(sucmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss-nulmiss) 
eff3 = (sucmiss+nulmiss*avail)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,35)' Man-Machine System Simulation' 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,35)' Final Report ' 
140 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,20)'Total number of missions : ',totmiss 
WRITE(iu,20)'Total number of successful missions:..'.sucmiss 
WRITE(iu,20)'Total number of failed missions: '.failmiss 
WRITE(iu,20)'Number of missions without any task;..'.nulmiss 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Availability '.avail 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Effec.l '.effl 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Effec.2 ',eff2 







f1 = FLOAT(nulmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
WRITE(iu,40) 0,nulmiss,nulmiss,fl,f1 
DO 200 i = l,k 
fl = FLOAT(freq(i,l))/FLOAT(totmiss) 









DO 400 i = l,ntype 









This subroutine computes the measures of effectiveness and 
prints them out 
FQRMAT(5X,I7,4X,4(F9.6,3X)) 
FORMAT(5X,A70) 
k = 0 
totmiss = nulmiss 
sucmiss = 0 
DO 100 i = l,nfreq 
totmiss = totmiss+freq(i,l) 
sucmiss = sucmiss+freq(i,2) 
IFCfreqCi.l) .NE. 0) k = i 
CONTINUE 
nreport = totmiss/50 
failmiss = totmiss-sucmiss-nulmiss 
avail = tavai/(ttotal*totmiss) 
effl = FLOATCsucmiss+nulmiss)/FLQAT(totmiss) 
eff2 = FLQAT(sucmiss)/FLOAT(totmiss-nulmiss) 
effS = (sucmiss+nulmiss*avail)/FLOAT(totmiss) 
IF(nreport .EQ. 1) THEN 
ttl=' Man-Machine System Simulation 






















mst ime ,inu, lambda, detpar, perpar, 
nmiss,seed,iu) 









WRITE(iu,30) ' Man-Machine System Simulation ' 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,30) ' Simulation Parameters ' 
WRITE(iu,*) 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Random number generator seed = '.seed 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Total time per mission (T) = ',ttotal 
WRITE(iu,20) ' Total number of missions = ',nmiss 
WRITE(iu,10) ' hardware repair rate (Betal) = ',betal 
WRITE(iu,10) ' hardware breakdown rate (Alphal) = ',alfal 
WRITE(iu,10) ' software repair rate (Beta2) = ',beta2 
WRITE(iu,10) ' software breakdown rate (Alpha2) = ',alfa2 
WRITE(iu,10) ' Service rate, (Mu) = ',mu 






Arrivai rate (Lambda) 
Detection-prob. parameter (D) 





















This procedure updates the component status 
Parameters : 
1/alfa me em up time 
1/beta mean down time 
seed seed for random number generator 
sta 0 (component down), 1 (component up) 
tsta time at which next status change will occur 
ttotal mission duration 
REAL alfa,beta,tsta,ttotal,rate,t 
INTEGER sta 






sta = 1-sta 
rate = (l-sta)*beta+sta*alfa 
t = AMINl(-ALOG(RND(seed))/rate,ttotal-tsta) 


































IF(s .EQ. 0) THEN 
s =1 
told = t 
IF(sl4s2 .NE. 1) THEN 




t = AMINl(tl,t2) 
tavai = tavai+(t-told) 
RETURN 
C 
hardware status (1=0N, 0=0FF) 
software status (1=0N, 0=0FF) 
time at which hardware status will change 
time at which software status will change 
system status (l=ON, 0=0FF) 
time at which system status will change 
total time that the system has been available 
mean up-time for hardware 
meem up time for software 
mean down-time for hardware 
mean down-time for software 
mission duration 





ELSE IPCs .EQ, 1) THEN 
s = 0 
100 IF(sl»s2 .NE. 0) THEN 




IF (si .Eq. 0) THEN 




IF(s2 .EQ. 1) THEN 





IF (s2 .EQ. 0) THEN 




IF(sl .EQ. 1) THEN 








































This subroutine checks whether a task can be completed. 
Parameters: 
busy 1 (machine busy), 0 (machine down) 
detpar parameter for detection probabilities 
seed seed for random number generator 
event indicates failure type: 
1 = Machine down 
2 = Machine busy 
3 = Task not detected 
4 = Task not performed accurately 
5 = Service time too long 
6 = Task accomplished successfully 
mstime maximum service time 
mu service rate 
perpar parameter for performance probabilities 
sta 1 (machine up), 0 (machine down) 
tarriv arrival time 
tbusy time when machine change from busy to idle (vv) 
tsta time when machine change from ON to OFF (vv) 
REAL tsta,tbusy,detpar,perpar,mu,mst ime,tarriv,p 
REAL stime,tcomp 
INTEGER event,sta,busy 
DOUBLE PRECISION seed 
Check machine status 
IF(sta .EQ. 0) THEN 
event = 1 
RETURN 
ENDIF 
IF(busy .EQ. 1) THEN 





Check IF task is detected and performed well 
Task detected ? 
p = EXP(-detpar*tarriv) 
IF(RND(seed) .GT. p) THEN 
event = 3 
RETÏÏRN 
END IF 
Task performed well 
p = EXP(-porpar»tarriv) 
IF(RND(seed) .GT. p) THEN 
event = 4 
RETÏÏRN 
END IF 
Check allocated time for task 
stime = -ALOG(RND(seed))/rau 
tcomp = tarriv+stime 
IF((stime .GT. mstime) .OR. (tcomp .GT. tsta)) THEN 
event = 5 
RETURN 
ENDIF 
Task performed successfully 
(Machine will be busy until time "tcomp") 
busy = 1 
tbusy = tcomp 
event = 6 
RETÏÏRN 
END 
